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Using the adoption of SFAS 131 as an exogenous change in disclosure quality of 
segment information, this study examines the impact of SFAS 131 on internal capital 
market efficiency and firm value. It finds that diversified firms that changed their 
segment definitions on adopting SFAS 131 (i.e., “change firms”) experienced greater 
improvement in capital allocation efficiency in internal capital markets in the post-
SFAS 131 period relative to the pre-SFAS 131 period than did a control sample of 
diversified firms that did not change their segment definitions (i.e., “no-change 
firms”). This result holds in a battery of tests designed to correct for the endogeneity 
in firms’ reporting choices following SFAS 131, suggesting that disclosure quality 
improves external monitoring and therefore investment efficiency. This study further 
shows that the improvement in capital allocation efficiency was achieved primarily by 
firms whose boards of directors were relatively less independent in the pre-SFAS 131 
period, suggesting that the strength of internal monitoring moderates the effect of 
disclosure quality (as a mechanism of external monitoring) on investment efficiency. 
In addition, it finds that proprietary costs moderate the impact of SFAS 131 on firm 
value. Specifically, change firms experienced a greater increase in firm value in the 
post-SFAS 131 period relative to the pre-SFAS 131 period than did no-change firms 
except for a subsample of firms with high proprietary costs, suggesting that SFAS 131 
reduced agency costs but also eroded competitive advantages. 
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 1. Introduction  
    This study provides evidence that SFAS 131 (Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 131 “Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and Related 
Information”) improved the efficiency with which firms allocate internal capital from 
low-opportunity segments to high-opportunity segments but had offsetting effects on 
firm value.1 SFAS 131 increased firm value by improving the monitoring of managers 
but, on the other hand, decreased firm value by revealing proprietary segment 
information. The net effect of SFAS 131 was to increase value for firms whose 
segments operate in more competitive industries but reduce value for firms whose 
segments operate in less competitive industries.  
    Like Botosan et al. (2009), my results indicate that SFAS 131 accomplished its 
stated goal of providing investors with better information on how diversified firms 
operate their segments and how each segment performs (FASB 1997, Para. 3-8).2 
Moreover, my study shows that the improved disclosure has a direct impact on how 
the firm allocates capital across segments. The study therefore extends the literature 
that investigates the relation between financial reporting quality and corporate 
investments.3 Existing studies generally suggest that accounting quality alleviates 
underinvestment because it decreases information asymmetry and thus adverse 
selection problems in external capital markets. My study is among the first to establish 
                                                 
1 Adopted for firms with fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1997, SFAS 131 supersedes SFAS 
14 (Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 14 “Financial Reporting for Segments of a 
Business Enterprise”) and requires firms to define their segments for financial reporting purposes to be 
consistent with those for internal decision-making. Relative to SFAS 14 that defines a segment based on 
its industry (as identified by managers), SFAS 131 reduces managerial discretion in segment 
disclosures because it demands that reported segments be aligned with internal organizational structures. 
2 I use the terms “diversified firm” and “multiple-segment firm” interchangeably throughout the paper 
to refer to a firm that reports multiple operating segments in its 10-K. In addition, I use the terms 
“stand-alone firm” and “single-segment firm” interchangeably to refer to a firm that does not report 
multiple operating segments. 
3 See, for example, Bushman and Smith (2001), Healy and Palepu (2001), Bens and Monahan (2004), 
Bushman et al. (2006), Biddle and Hilary (2006), Lambert et al. (2007), Hope and Thomas (2008), 
McNichols and Stubben (2008), Biddle et al. (2009), Beatty et al. (2009), Beatty et al. (2010), Francis 
and Martin (2010), and Garcia Lara et al. (2010).  
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 a link between disclosure quality and internal capital markets.4
    Berger and Hann (2003) suggest that SFAS 131 improved the monitoring 
environment. My study is motivated by the observation that improved monitoring 
should not only reveal agency problems (as argued by Berger and Hann (2003)), but 
should also reduce them. To test for such effects, I conduct a difference in differences 
analysis by focusing on a sample of firms that existed as diversified firms in both pre- 
and post-SFAS 131 periods (henceforth known as “multiple-to-multiple firms). The 
use of  multiple-to-multiple firms allows me to compare the effect of SFAS 131 on a 
group of diversified firms that changed their segment definitions (henceforth known as 
“change firms”) to the effect of the same standard on a control group of diversified 
firms that did not change their segment definitions (henceforth known as “no-change 
firms”). While SFAS 131 is mandatory, if a firm already reported its segments as 
aligned with internal organizational structures (as demanded by SFAS 131), it did not 
need to change its segment definitions on adopting SFAS 131. The difference in 
differences analysis enables me to parse out the effect of reporting changes following 
SFAS 131 from other economic changes during the sample period. 
    To measure cross-segment transfers before and after SFAS 131, I hand-collected 
segment information restated in compliance with SFAS 131 (disclosed in the first 
year’s 10-Ks after SFAS 131) for change firms’ pre-SFAS 131 segment data. By using 
segment information prepared by the same standard for both pre- and post-SFAS 131 
periods, this study eliminates the possibility that any observed improvement in capital 
allocation efficiency may be a mere artifact of more disaggregated segment data. 
Using Rajan et al.’s (2000) measure of cross-segment transfers, I find that change 
firms allocated more (less) capital to segments with better (poorer) investment 
                                                 
4 Diversified firms are reported to rely less on external financing because they can use internal capital 
markets to fund their projects (Ettredge et al. 2006). Without the evidence reported in this study, 
therefore, one could argue that disclosure quality may not be important for diversified firms. However, 
this study suggests that disclosure quality does matter in internal capital markets. 
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 opportunities in the post-SFAS 131 period relative to the pre-SFAS 131 period to a 
greater extent than did no-change firms. This result holds with an alternative measure 
of capital allocation efficiency based on Billett and Mauer’s (2003) proxy for subsidy. 
In addition, I find that more efficient capital allocation results in enhanced firm value. 
Taken together, these results are consistent with the claim that high-quality disclosures 
improve external monitoring and, therefore, investment efficiency (e.g., Biddle and 
Hilary 2006; Biddle et al. 2009, etc). 
    Given that SFAS 131-type segment information was already available to 
managers and boards of directors before the adoption of SFAS 131, however, these 
results would be surprising if firms have strong internal monitoring. To better 
understand the role of internal monitoring, I conduct additional analyses after dividing 
the sample firms into subsamples of high vs. low board independence. These analyses 
demonstrate that the improvement in capital allocation efficiency after the adoption of 
SFAS 131 was achieved primarily by firms whose boards of directors were relatively 
less independent in the pre-SFAS 131 period, suggesting that the strength of internal 
monitoring moderates the effect of disclosure quality (as a mechanism of external 
monitoring) on investment efficiency. 
    My results also clarify existing evidence on how SFAS 131 affected firm value. 
Berger and Hann (2003) find that single-to-multiple firms (i.e., those reported as 
single-segment firms under SFAS 14 but as multiple-segment firms under SFAS 131) 
suffered a value decrease when they began disclosing segment information. Berger 
and Hann (2003) interpret this as evidence that SFAS 131 revealed agency problems 
associated with internal capital markets. However, an alternative explanation is that 
improved disclosures imposed proprietary costs on multiple-segment firms. Preparers 
expressed concerns about such costs during FASB deliberations over SFAS 131 
(FASB 1997, Para. 62), and empirical evidence confirms that proprietary costs drive 
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 segment aggregation (Harris 1998; Botosan and Stanford 2005; Bens et al. 2009). 
    To test for the impact of proprietary costs on firm value, following Harris (1998) 
and Botosan and Stanford (2005), I measure the persistence of abnormal profits of 
industries in which each segment operates. I find that change firms experienced a 
greater increase in firm value in the post-SFAS 131 period relative to the pre-SFAS 
131 period than did no-change firms in a subsample of firms with low proprietary 
costs (i.e., those whose segments operate in industries with relatively low persistence 
of abnormal profits). However, when the sample is limited to a subsample of firms 
with high proprietary costs (i.e., those whose segments operate in industries with 
relatively high persistence of abnormal profits), this value enhancement disappears, 
suggesting that high-quality disclosures may increase firm value by reducing agency 
costs, but the effect is conditional on proprietary costs. This result is consistent with 
the findings of Harris (1998) and Botosan and Stanford (2005), which suggest that 
firms tend to aggregate their segments to hide abnormal profits of their segments 
operating in less competitive industries. 
    To the extent that segment aggregation is driven by agency and proprietary costs, 
my change vs. no-change classification could occur at least partially due to strategic 
considerations by managers. This could bias my analysis in favor of the documented 
results if no-change firms have a greater tendency than change firms to aggregate 
segments in a way that masks real capital allocation efficiency. However, the data 
suggest the contrary. I also find that my results are robust to a battery of tests designed 
to correct for self-selection biases. 
    My findings as a whole deliver the following messages. First, SFAS 131 
improved the monitoring of managers, resulting in more efficient capital allocation in 
internal capital markets. Second, greater reporting transparency and improved capital 
allocation had a positive impact on firm value. However, more transparent segment 
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 disclosures not only reduce agency costs but also increase competitive harm, offsetting 
the effect of SFAS 131 on value for firms with high proprietary costs. 
    The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses related 
literature and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes data and sample selection. 
Section 4 introduces a measure of capital allocation efficiency. Section 5 provides 
empirical evidence. Section 6 discusses robustness analyses. Finally, section 7 
concludes. 
 
2. Related Literature and Hypothesis Development 
2.1. SFAS 131 and Segment Disclosures 
    Prior studies have examined the impact of SFAS 131 on the information 
environment. Herrmann and Thomas (2000) and Street et al. (2000) find that SFAS 
131 induced firms to increase the number of reported segments and to provide more 
disaggregated information. Berger and Hann (2003) find a significant reduction in 
analysts’ forecast errors, providing evidence that after SFAS 131 analysts were able to 
access new information previously hidden under SFAS 14. In addition, Ettredge et al. 
(2005) find that SFAS 131 increased the stock market’s ability to predict a firm’s 
future earnings. 
    Prior studies also exploit the adoption of SFAS 131 as an experimental setting to 
examine the motives behind segment aggregation. Using a sample of single-to-
multiple firms (i.e., those reported as single-segment firms under SFAS 14 but as 
multiple-segment firms under SFAS 131), Botosan and Stanford (2005) find that firms 
took advantage of the latitude in SFAS 14 to obscure the abnormal profitability of 
their segments operating in less competitive industries. Consistent with the proprietary 
cost hypothesis (Verrecchia 1983; Wagenhofer 1990; Hayes and Lundholm 1996, 
Harris 1998, etc), their results suggest that firms tend to mask themselves to appear as 
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 if they underperform when they actually outperform their competitors. 
    Another motive to preclude disclosure is agency costs (Shleifer and Vishny 1989; 
Nagar 1999; Nagar et al. 2003). Berger and Hann (2007) find that managers tend to 
withhold information about segments with relatively low abnormal profits when they 
focus on a sample of firms where agency cost motives dominate (i.e., those identified 
as having inefficient capital transfers to segments that perform relatively poorly). A 
related paper by Berger and Hann (2003) finds that single-to-multiple firms suffered a 
value decrease when they initiated disclosing segment information. The authors 
interpret this as evidence that SFAS 131 revealed agency problems associated with 
internal capital markets. They find that the greater the amount of previously hidden 
cross-segment capital transfers, the greater the reduction in such transfers during the 
first year after SFAS 131.  
    In contrast, Hope and Thomas (2008) provide evidence that SFAS 131 has 
weakened monitoring for multinational firms. This is because SFAS 131 no longer 
requires a disclosure of segment earnings by geographic areas if operating segments 
are defined on any basis other than geographic areas. Hope and Thomas (2008) find a 
greater tendency of “empire building” in foreign operations of multinational firms 
under SFAS 131. 
 
2.2. Hypothesis Development 
    A segment of a diversified firm can be funded from the cash flows generated by 
other segments of the firm.5 Diversified firms, therefore, can use internal capital 
markets as an alternative financing mechanism. Internal capital markets can create 
value because they enable a segment to fund a project that external capital markets 
                                                 
5 Lamont (1997) finds that oil companies significantly reduced their non-oil investment in 1986 when 
oil prices fell by 50 percent (the 1986 oil shock), suggesting that diversified firms tend to subsidize their 
poorly-performing segments. Shin and Stulz (1998) find that a segment’s investment is associated not 
only with its own cash flows but also with the cash flows of other segments.  
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 would not be able to finance. In particular, given that CEOs have superior information 
about project quality, internal capital markets can achieve more efficient capital 
allocation than external capital markets as long as CEOs have right incentives to work 
in shareholders’ interest (Weston 1970; Williamson 1975; Gertner et al. 1994; Stein 
1997).  
    However, if right incentives are not provided (through monitoring or contracts), 
internal capital markets can be inefficient and thus can destroy value because CEOs 
are often tempted to misallocate internal capital in their own self-interest. The 
inefficiency is related to agency costs such as CEOs’ desires for “empire building” or 
the rent-seeking behavior of divisional managers, which causes them to finance pet 
projects with negative net present value or subsidize poorly performing divisions that, 
if they were stand-alone firms, would not be able to survive (Jensen 1986; Stulz 1990; 
Scharfstein and Stein 2000; Rajan et al. 2000. etc). However, if improved monitoring 
after SFAS 131 made it more costly for diversified firms to acquire, keep, or subsidize 
divisions with poor investment opportunities, managers’ self-serving, inefficient cross-
segment capital transfers are likely to be mitigated in internal capital markets after 
SFAS 131. 
    While the adoption of SFAS 131 is mandatory, if a firm already reported its 
segments to be aligned with internal organizational structures (as demanded by SFAS 
131), it did not need to change its segment definitions on adopting SFAS 131 (firms 
that did not change their segment definitions are hereafter called “no-change firms”). 
By contrast, if a firm’s reported segments were not consistent with internal 
organizational structures, the firm was required to make changes in its segment 
definitions (firms that changed their segment definition to comply with SFAS 131 are 
hereafter called “change firms”). Given that SFAS 131 has improved the monitoring 
environment (as suggested by Berger and Hann (2003)), this study hypothesizes that 
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 change firms experienced greater improvement in capital allocation efficiency in the 
post-SFAS 131 period relative to the pre-SFAS 131 period than did no-change firms.  
    In addition, if SFAS 131 improved monitoring and thus induced more efficient 
investments, we should observe a greater increase in firm value for change firms than 
for no-change firms after SFAS 131. However, SFAS 131 could negatively influence 
firm value if more disaggregated segment disclosures cause competitive harm by 
releasing proprietary information to competitors. Therefore, this study further 
hypothesizes that the beneficial effect of SFAS 131 on firm value for change firms is 
conditional on the relative magnitude of their proprietary costs. 
 
3. Data and Sample Selection 
3.1. Data 
    I obtained segment- and firm-level accounting data from Compustat and firm-
level market data from CRSP, both provided by Wharton Research Data Services 
(WRDS). In addition, for change firms, I hand-collected segment information restated 
by SFAS 131 for the pre-SFAS 131 period by reading their 10-Ks filed with the SEC 
in the year the firms first applied SFAS 131.6 For change firms, I use the restated data 
hand-collected from 10-Ks as segment data during the pre-SFAS 131 period and use 
the reported data machine-read from Compustat as segment data during the post-SFAS 
131 period. However, for no-change firms, I simply use the reported data from 
Compustat as segment data during both pre- and post-SFAS 131 periods.   
    My sample is restricted to the four-year period centered around the adoption of 
SFAS 131 because most change firms provide restated segment data for just one or 
two years preceding the adoption of the new standard. Since SFAS 131 is effective for 
                                                 
6 The use of the restated data allows me to eliminate an alternative explanation that SFAS 131 may not 
have caused a real change in managerial behavior but only disaggregated the segments of change firms 
in a way that make capital allocation appear more efficient in the post-SFAS 131 period. Berger and 
Hann (2003, 2007) also use hand-collected segment data restated following SFAS 131. 
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 fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1997, December year-end firms adopted 
SFAS 131 in 1998 while non-December year-end firms adopted this standard in 1999. 
Therefore, for December year-end firms, the pre-SFAS 131 period covers 1996 and 
1997 and the post-SFAS 131 period covers 1998 and 1999. For non-December year-
end firms, the pre-SFAS 131 period covers 1997 and 1998 and the post-SFAS 131 
period covers 1999 and 2000.  
 
3.2. Sample Selection 
    I focus on firms that provided segment information both before and after the 
adoption of SFAS 131 (i.e., multiple-to-multiple firms) primarily because my 
difference in differences analysis requires a control sample with segment information 
for the entire study period.7 I begin with 33,264 firm-years and 50,389 reported 
business segments that appear in the segment data from Compustat for firms 
incorporated in the U.S. during the four-year period around the adoption of SFAS 
131.8 From these, I exclude firm-years operating in financial service industries (SIC 
code between 6000 and 6999) and regulated utilities industries (SIC code between 
4900 and 4999), which leaves 27,851 firm-years and 40,708 firm-year-segments.9 
                                                 
7 It is not possible to conduct a difference in differences analysis by using single-to-multiple firms 
because their control group, single-to-single firms, does not provide publicly available segment 
information.  
8 To have only business segments in the sample, I first exclude segments whose segment type is not 
coded as “BUSSEG” in Compustat. In addition, I further exclude segments whose segment name starts 
with “elimination”, “unallocated”, “reconciliation”,  “reconciling”, “intra-group”, “not classified”, or 
something like these names indicating that they are not the actual business segments but the adjustment 
of segment items to firm-level items.Segments with their names starting with “other”, “all other”, 
“general corporate”, “corp” or “corporate” are problematic because some firms use these names to refer 
to the amount of adjustment of segment items to firm-level items, but other firms use these names to 
refer to actual business segments or the combination of minor business segments and the amount of the 
adjustment. In this study, I exclude the segments with these names if the segments’ SIC codes are 
missing or any asset, sale, or capital expenditure has a negative value.   
9 The segment data from Compustat assign to each firm a SIC code, DNUM, but DNUM is constant 
over time because it reflects the firm’s latest industry affiliation, not the history of industry affiliation. 
Therefore, I used a SIC code from CRSP, SICCD, to eliminate firms operating in financial services and 
utilities industries. However, when I examined the segments of the firms not classified as financial 
services or utilities firms by SICCD but classified as financial services or utilities firms by DNUM, I 
found that many of their segments operate in financial services or utilities industries. Therefore, I 
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 Using the remaining firm-segment-years, I compute the number of segments for each 
firm-year and exclude firm-years with less than two segments, ending with 7,181 firm-
years and 19,975 firm-year-segments. This is the initial sample of multiple-segment 
firms based on Compustat. 
    To identify whether a firm is a change or no-change firm, I compare a firm’s 
segment identifiers (SIDs as reported in Compustat) in the last year before SFAS 131 
was adopted (i.e., year – 1) and the firm’s SIDs in the year after SFAS 131 was first 
applied (i.e., year + 1). For a firm to be a no-change firm, I require it to have the same 
number of segments in both years and have an identical SID for each segment in both 
years. Otherwise, it is classified as a change firm. One necessary condition for this 
classification is that a firm must exist as a multiple-segment firm satisfying the above 
sample selection criteria both in the last year before the adoption of SFAS 131 (i.e., 
year – 1) and in the first year after its adoption (i.e., year + 1). 
    The procedure described above results in 1,599 firm-years and 5,173 firm-year-
segments comprising the change firm sample, and 2,057 firm-years and 5,350 firm-
year-segments comprising the no-change or control firm sample (Panel A of Table 
1).10 To obtain change firms’ segment data restated as required by SFAS 131, I used 
EDGAR, provided by the SEC (www.sec.gov), to search for the 10-Ks filed during the 
year they adopted SFAS 131. For firms whose 10-Ks are not available in EDGAR, I 
searched for their 10-Ks or annual reports through the firms’ investor relations 
websites, where possible.11 
                                                                                                                                            
exclude firms from the sample if either DNUM or SICCD indicates they belong to financial services or 
utilities industries.   
10 My classification procedure is subject to several errors. First, early adopters of SFAS 131 could be 
wrongly classified as no-change firms. Second, firms could be wrongly classified as change firms if 
they acquired or divested businesses or engaged in business restructuring following the adoption of 
SFAS 131. However, the biases arising from such misclassifications would work against my hypotheses. 
11 While hand-collecting segment data, I found occasional discrepancies between the 10-K and 
Compustat data. In such instances, I adjusted the Compustat data to be consistent with the 10-K data. 11 
firms originally classified as change firms based on Compustat data were reclassified as no-change 
firms based on the 10-K information. 
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Table 1. Number of Change and No-Change Firms Each Year 
 
Panel A. Initial Multiple-Segment Firms Based on Compustat Data
No. of Firms No. of Segments No. of Firms No. of Segments
Year -2 400 1,145 480 1,272
Year -1 432 1,244 559 1,434
Year 1 432 1,590 559 1,434
Year 2 335 1,194 459 1,210
Total 1,599 5,173 2,057 5,350
Panel B. Final Multiple-Segment Firms Based on Restated Data (Hand-Collected) and Compustat Data 
No. of Firms No. of Segments No. of Firms No. of Segments
Year -2 361 1,365 489 1,300
Year -1 398 1,499 569 1,464
Year 1 420 1,618 568 1,465
Year 2 325 1,164 463 1,222
Total 1,504 5,646 2,089 5,451
Multiple-to-Multiple Change Firms Multiple-to-Multiple No Change Firms
Multiple-to-Multiple Change Firms Multiple-to-Multiple No Change Firms
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     Finally, if a firm changed its fiscal year-end during the sample period, I excluded 
the firm-year first observed after the fiscal year-end change in order to avoid distorting 
the comparability of the capital allocation measure which is defined on an annual basis. 
Incorporating all the above adjustments, the final sample (Panel B of Table 1) consists 
of 1,504 firm-years and 5,646 firm-year-segments for change firms, and 2,089 firm-
years and 5,451 firm-year-segments for no-change firms. Table 2 provides additional 
details on these firms. 
 
4. Measure of Capital Allocation Efficiency 
4.1. High q vs. Low q Segments 
    This study considers an internal capital market more efficient if it transfers more 
(less) capital to segments with high (low) growth opportunities. I use Tobin’s q 
measured at the beginning of a fiscal year as a measure of growth opportunities and 
compute a firm’s q as (market value of common stocks + book value of preferred 
stocks + book value of debt) / book value of total assets. Because a segment’s q is not 
directly observed, similar to prior studies (e.g., Lang and Stulz 1994; Berger and Ofek 
1995; Rajan et al. 2000, etc), I use the median q of single-segment firms operating in 
the industry in which the segment also operates as a proxy for segment’s q.12 The 
segment's industry is defined based on the narrowest SIC grouping (starting with four 
digits) that yields at least three single-segment firms with non-missing q. Following 
Rajan et al.’s (2000) approach, I classify a segment as a high q segment (a segment 
with high growth opportunities) if the segment’s q is above the asset-weighted average 
                                                 
12 Single-segment firms are the firms reported in Compustat during the sample period but not included 
in my initial sample of multiple-segment firms. Similar to sample selection criteria for multiple-
segment firms, I excluded single-segment firm-years operating in financial service industries (SIC code 
between 6000 and 6999) and regulated utilities industries (SIC code between 4900 and 4999). Also if a 
firm changed its fiscal year-end during the sample period, I further excluded the first firm-year 
observation after the fiscal year-end change. I used SICCD from CRSP to identify single-segment 
firms’ SIC code. 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Change and No-Change Firms 
 
Panel A. Pre-SFAS 131 Period
Mean No. of Obs. Mean No. of Obs.
Weighted Average Signed Transfer t -0.0001 434 0.0038 572 -0.0040 -1.17
Weighted Average Signed Subsidy t -0.0001 434 0.0117 572 -0.0118 -2.70
Concentration Ratio t 0.3576 660 0.3611 972 -0.0035 -0.37
Abnormal Profit Persistence t 0.7720 657 0.6530 963 0.1191 1.82
Diversity t 0.2805 531 0.2992 668 -0.0188 -1.75
Market Value t-1 $3,685,185,224 670 $1,700,378,798 859 $1,984,806,426 5.04
Institutional Ownership t-1 0.3424 669 0.3023 856 0.0400 2.75
Number of Analysts t-1 5.7162 673 4.1682 862 1.5480 4.11
Big Auditor t 0.9340 758 0.8355 1058 0.0985 6.77
Tobin's q  t 1.6975 688 1.7595 898 -0.0620 -1.34
Asset t-1 $3,463,363,239 673 $1,604,298,720 862 $1,859,064,519 5.81
Sale t $3,425,744,787 691 $1,779,857,693 903 $1,645,887,094 5.28
ROA t 0.0943 673 0.0833 862 0.0110 1.67
Investment Ratio t 0.0785 667 0.0826 844 -0.0041 -1.07
Diversification t 0.4873 759 0.5959 1,057 -0.1086 -12.34
t-value Change Firms  No Change Firms Difference
 
See Appendix C for variable definitions. All computed variables are Winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles in the pre-SFAS 131 
period sample. 
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Table 2. (Continued) 
 
Panel B. Post-SFAS 131 Period
Mean No. of Obs. Mean No. of Obs.
Weighted Average Signed Transfer t 0.0048 417 -0.0032 518 0.0080 2.05
Weighted Average Signed Subsidy t 0.0201 390 0.0021 459 0.0180 1.63
Concentration Ratio t 0.3652 668 0.3693 912 -0.0041 -0.47
Abnormal Profit Persistence t 1.0003 655 0.7346 893 0.2657 2.37
Diversity t 0.3001 522 0.3206 647 -0.0205 -1.86
Market Value t-1 $4,357,703,721 683 $2,268,756,267 852 $2,088,947,454 4.10
Institutional Ownership t-1 0.3796 681 0.3359 857 0.0437 2.89
Number of Analysts t-1 4.8510 745 3.3996 1031 1.4514 4.73
Big Auditor t 0.9128 745 0.8070 1,031 0.1058 6.58
Tobin's q  t 1.6771 688 1.6762 873 0.0009 0.01
Asset t-1 $3,491,368,739 685 $1,756,279,958 858 $1,735,088,781 5.70
Sale t $3,178,609,526 694 $1,909,741,352 883 $1,268,868,174 4.47
ROA t 0.0604 685 0.0649 858 -0.0046 -0.62
Investment Ratio t 0.0710 678 0.0793 840 -0.0083 -2.07
Diversification t 0.4893 745 0.5971 1,031 -0.1077 -12.13
 Change Firms  No Change Firms Difference t-value
 
See Appendix C for variable definitions. All computed variables are Winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles in the post-SFAS 131 
period sample. 
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 q of all the segments belonging to the segment’s firm. Similarly, I also classify a 
segment as a low q segment (a segment with low growth opportunities) if the 
segment’s q is below the asset-weighted average q of all the segments belonging to the 
segment’s firm. If a firm has two segments that operate in the same industry, high q or 
low q segments are not defined, decreasing the size of usable sample.13
 
4.2. Measure of Cross-Segment Transfers  
    I use firm- and industry-adjusted investment ratio (i.e., the ratio of capital 
expenditure to beginning-of-period assets) developed by Rajan et al. (2000) as a 
measure of cross-segment transfers. This measure captures firm-adjusted differences 
in investment ratios between a segment of a diversified firm and its stand-alone peers 
operating in the same industry. The construction of this measure starts from the notion 
that the difference between the investment a segment made when it was a part of a 
diversified firm and the counterfactual investment it would have made had it been a 
stand-alone firm (reflected by the investment ratio adjusted by industry) would 
represent transfers made (if negative) or received (if positive).14 However, if 
diversified firms have lower cost of borrowing and thus likely have more capital from 
external financing than stand-alone firms, the industry-adjusted investment ratio 
overestimates transfers. To correct for this, Rajan et al. (2000) further adjust each 
segment’s industry-adjusted investment ratio by subtracting the industry-adjusted 
investment ratio averaged across all the segments of a firm from the segment’s 
industry-adjusted investment ratio. Consistent with Rajan et al. (2000), I call this firm- 
                                                 
13 Using this algorithm, among 25,246 segments in the final sample, 12,655 segments (50.1%) have 
industry q based on four-digit SIC code, 5,950 (23.6%) segments have industry q based on three-digit 
SIC code, 690 segments (2.7%) have industry q based on two-digit SIC code, and four segments (0.0%) 
have industry q based on one-digit SIC code. The remaining 5,947 segments (23.6%) do not have 
industry q either because the segments’ SIC codes are missing or because their industries do not have at 
least three single-segment firms with non-missing q.   
14 This argument is based on the assumption that all transfers made or received by a segment 
correspond to a decrease or increase in the segment’s investment (Rajan et al. 2000).  
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 and industry-adjusted investment ratio Transfer throughout this paper. Specifically, 
Transfer of segment j of firm i in year t is computed as 
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CAPXijt is the capital expenditure of segment j of firm i in year t. BAijt-1 is the book4 
value of the assets of segment j of firm i in year t-1. 15 CAPXijt / BAijt-1 is the 
investment ratio of segment j of firm i in year t. CAPXssijt / BAssijt-1 is the investment 
ratio of a single-segment firm matched with the segment j of firm i in year t. I use the 
median investment ratio of single-segment firms operating in the industry in which the 
segment also operates as the hypothetical investment ratio the segment would have 
had if it had been a single-segment firm. Finally, wijt is segment j’s share of total assets 
of firm i, and n is the number of segments of firm i. 16  
    In addition, to estimate overall efficiency of internal capital markets, I further 
define Signed Transfer for segment j as follows: 
 
                                                 
15 Because most firms provide restated segment information for only up to two years prior to the 
adoption of SFAS 131, the beginning-of-period value of segment asset is not available for the first 
restated year (year -2). Therefore, for the firms in this year, I compute a segment’s beginning-of-period 
asset as end-of-period asset minus estimated net earnings of the segment. I estimate the segment’s net 
earnings as (operating profit – imputed interest expense) * (1 – imputed tax rate) – estimated dividend 
paid by the segment. Imputed interest expense is computed as the product of the segment’s reported sale 
and the median ratio of interest expense to sales of single-segment firms in the segment’s industry. 
Imputed tax rate is computed as the median ratio of taxes paid to pretax income of single-segment firms 
in the segment’s industry. Estimated dividend paid by the segment is computed as dividend paid by the 
firm multiplied by (end-of-period segment asset / sum of end-of-period segment assets of the firm). 
16 I only consider the segments whose assets and capital expenditures are not missing (so the 
investment ratio is computable). Instead of using firm-level assets, I use the sum of segment assets as a 
denominator in computing wijt to exclude the segments whose investment ratio is not computable.  
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 Signed Transfer j = (+1) * segment j’s firm- and industry-adjusted investment ratio if 
segment j is a high q segment 
Signed Transfer j = (-1) * segment j’s firm- and industry-adjusted investment ratio if 
segment j is a low q segment. 
 
Signed Transfer takes a positive value if a high q segment receives transfers (or has a 
positive firm- and industry-adjusted investment ratio) or a low q segment makes 
transfers (or has a negative firm- and industry-adjusted investment ratio). In contrast, 
Signed Transfer takes a negative value if a high q segment makes transfers (or has a 
negative firm- and industry-adjusted investment ratio) or a low q segment receives 
transfers (or has a positive firm- and industry-adjusted investment ratio). Therefore, 
Signed Transfer will take a more positive value as an internal capital market allocates 
more capital in an efficient direction. 
    Finally, I compute Weighted Average Signed Transfer as a measure of firm-level 
efficiency of cross-segment transfers, using segment assets to compute weights. 
Specifically, Weighted Average Signed Transfer for firm i in year t is computed as 
 
Weighted Average Signed Transferi,t  =  Signed Transferijt ⋅∑
=
n
j
ijtw
1
 where wijt = 
∑
=
n
j
ijt
ijt
BA
BA
1
.  
BAijt is the book value of assets of segment j of firm i in year t wijt is segment j’s share 
of the total assets of firm i, and n is the number of segments of firm i.17  
 
                                                 
17 To compute the asset-weighted average Signed Transfer, I only use the segments whose Signed 
Transfer and assets are not missing. Therefore, instead of using firm-level assets, I use the sum of 
segment assets as a denominator in computing wijt to exclude the segments whose Signed Transfer or 
assets are missing.  
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 5. Empirical Analyses 
5.1. Segment Level Analysis 
    Table 3 compares capital allocation of multiple-to-multiple firms proxied for by 
Transfer between the pre- and post-SFAS 131 periods. In Panel A, when the segments 
of change firms are examined, the firm- and industry-adjusted investment ratio is 
0.59% for low q segments and -0.47% for high q segments in the pre-SFAS 131 
period. The difference between the two types of segments is 1.06% and is statistically 
significant, implying that more funds were transferred from high q segments to low q 
segments in internal capital markets in the pre-SFAS 131 period. Signed Transfer is -
47% in the pre-SFAS 131 period, which is negative (though not statistically 
significant). This is consistent with the claim by prior studies that diversified firms fail 
to allocate capital efficiently (e.g., Berger and Ofek 1995; Scharfstein 1998; Rajan et 
al. 2000, etc). However, in the post-SFAS 131 period, the firm- and industry-adjusted 
investment ratio is -1.13% for low q segments and 0.66% for high q segments. The 
difference between the two types of segments is -1.79% and is statistically significant. 
Signed Transfer takes a positive value, 1.03%, and is also significant. A comparison of 
the pre- and post-SFAS 131 periods shows a statistically significant decrease in fund 
flows to low q segments and an increase in fund flows to high q segments, with  
Signed Transfer increasing by 1.50% (statistically significant). These findings suggest 
that internal capital markets became more efficient for diversified firms that changed 
their segment definitions on adopting SFAS 131. 
    Panel B of Table 3 examines the segments of no-change firms, my control group. 
In the pre-SFAS 131 period, neither the difference in the firm- and industry-adjusted 
investment ratio between low q and high q segments nor Signed Transfer is 
significantly different from zero. However, as a stark contrast to the change firms in 
Panel A, the firm- and industry-adjusted investment ratio is more positive for low q 
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 Table 3. Segment-Level Analysis of Transfer 
 
Panel A. Multiple-to-Multiple Change Firms
Low-High
Difference
Transfer 0.0059 -0.0047 0.0106 1.82 -0.0047 -1.56
No. Obs. 695 676 1,371
Transfer -0.0113 0.0066 -0.0179 -2.35 0.0103 2.58
No. Obs. 622 612 1,234
Pre-Post Diff. 0.0172 -0.0114 -0.0150
t-value 2.76 -1.56 -3.00
Panel B. Multiple-to-Multiple No-Change Firms
Low-High
Difference
Transfer -0.0014 -0.0015 0.0001 0.03 0.0002 0.09
No. Obs. 705 705 1,410
Transfer 0.0068 -0.0108 0.0176 2.51 -0.0081 -2.25
No. Obs. 627 613 1,240
Pre-Post Diff. -0.0082 0.0093 0.0083
t-value -1.37 1.52 1.89
Low q  Segments High q  Segments t-value Signed Transfer
Pre-SFAS 131 Period
Post-SFAS 131 Period
t-value
Pre-SFAS 131 Period
Post-SFAS 131 Period
Low q  Segments High q  Segments t-value Signed Transfer t-value
 
Panels A and B of Table 3 compare capital allocation of multiple-to-multiple firms proxied for by Transfer between the pre- and post-SFAS 
131 periods. A segment’s Transfer is computed as firm- and industry-adjusted investment ratio. Investment ratio is the ratio of the segment’s 
capital expenditure to the segment’s beginning-of-period assets. Industry-adjusted investment ratio is the segment’s investment ratio minus the 
median investment ratio of single-segment firms operating in the industry in which the segment also operates. Firm- and industry-adjusted 
investment ratio is the segment’s industry-adjusted investment ratio minus the asset-weighted average industry-adjusted investment ratio across 
all segments belonging to the segment’s firm. Signed Transfer is (+1) times Transfer if a segment is a high q segment and (-1) times Transfer if 
a segment is a low q segment. Transfer is Winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles in each pre- and post-SFAS 131 sample.
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Table 3. (Continued) 
 
Panel C. Difference in Differences
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Transfer to Low q  Segments Transfer to High q  Segments Signed Transfer
Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat
Intercept -0.0014 -0.0015 0.0002
-0.42 -0.43 0.09
Post 131 0.0082 -0.0093 -0.0083
1.37 -1.52 -1.89*
Change Firm 0.0073 -0.0032 -0.0049
1.43 -0.56 -1.26
Post 131 * Change Firm -0.0253 0.0207 0.0233
-2.94*** 2.17** 3.50***
No. of Obs. 2,649 2,606 5,255
Adj R-Squared 0.0031 0.0015 0.0027  
 
Panel C of Table 3 reports the results of regression analyses when Transfer to low q segments, Transfer to high q segments, and Signed 
Transfer are used as dependent variables. A segment’s Transfer is computed as firm- and industry-adjusted investment ratio. Investment ratio is 
the ratio of the segment’s capital expenditure to the segment’s beginning-of-period assets. Industry-adjusted investment ratio is the segment’s 
investment ratio minus the median investment ratio of single-segment firms operating in the industry in which the segment also operates. Firm- 
and industry-adjusted investment ratio is the segment’s industry-adjusted investment ratio minus the asset-weighted average industry-adjusted 
investment ratio averaged across every segment belonging to the segment’s firm. Signed Transfer is (+1) times Transfer if a segment is a high 
q segment and (-1) times Transfer if a segment is a low q segment. Post 131 is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a segment belongs 
to a firm in the post-SFAS 131 period and 0 otherwise. Change Firm is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a segment belongs to a 
change firm and 0 otherwise. Post 131 * Change Firm is a product of Post 131 and Change Firm. All computed variables are Winsorized at the 
first and ninety-ninth percentiles in each pre- and post-SFAS 131 sample. T-statistics are estimated using heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors. 
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 segments and more negative for high q segments in the post-SFAS 131 period. The 
difference between the two types of segments is 1.76% (statistically significant), 
suggesting that no-change firms transferred more funds to low q segments from high q 
segments. Signed Transfer is -0.81% (statistically significant), also suggesting that 
internal capital markets did not work efficiently in the post-SFAS 131 period. Signed 
Transfer decreased by 0.83% from the pre- to the post-SFAS 131 period, suggesting 
that no-change firms experienced a deterioration in capital allocation efficiency after 
the adoption of SFAS 131.18
    Panel C of Table 3 reports the results of the difference in differences analysis, 
testing the hypothesis of this study. To isolate the effect of SFAS 131 from any other 
changes that might have occurred during the sample period, the firm- and industry-
adjusted investment ratio is regressed on Post 131, Change Firm, and Post 131 * 
Change Firm. Post 131 is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a segment 
belongs to a firm in the post-SFAS 131 period and 0 otherwise. Change Firm is an 
indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a segment belongs to a change firm and 0 
                                                 
18 There could be two potential explanations for these findings. First, SFAS 131 requires a management 
approach in defining segments, but at the same time it also makes several concessions. For example, 
under SFAS 14, all multinational firms were required to disclose earnings by geographic areas. But 
under SFAS 131, firms have the option of whether or not to disclose geographic earnings if operating 
segments are defined on any basis other than geographic areas. This feature of SFAS 131 impaired the 
monitoring of managers in multinational firms (Hope and Thomas 2008). In addition, SFAS 131 “does 
not define segment profit or loss and does not require that whatever measure of profit or loss is reported 
be consistent with the attribution of assets to reportable segments. By not defining segment profit or 
loss, this Statement allows any measure of performance to be displayed as segment profit or loss as long 
as that measure is reviewed by the chief operating decision maker” (SFAS No. 131, 1997, Para. 40). To 
the extent that this feature of SFAS 131 harms the comparability of segment profits across firms, it may 
also have impaired the monitoring environment. Other criticisms against SFAS 131 include “the 
abandonment of the requirement that segment data conform to GAAP, the fact that internal cost 
allocations are subject to considerable discretion, and the concern that managers have strong incentives 
to manipulate internal segment information used in performance evaluation” (Berger and Hann 2003, 
p.165). Therefore, the net effect of SFAS 131 on monitoring could be negative if firms didn’t change 
their segment definitions following the management approach. Second, some macroeconomic changes 
in the post-SFAS 131 period (e.g., the late 1990s’ dot-com bubble) could have caused a firm’s capital 
allocation to appear less efficient if the firm concealed its operations in the booming industries by 
segment aggregation. To the extent that no-change firms have greater propensity to hide such operations 
than change firms, it will create a bias in favor of my hypothesis. I conduct a battery of sensitivity tests 
to control for the possibility of such a bias. 
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 otherwise. Post 131 * Change Firm, the product of Post 131 and Change Firm, is a key 
variable whose coefficient captures the difference in differences in capital allocation 
efficiency between change and no-change firms around the adoption of SFAS 131. 
    In column 2, when transfers to low q segments are examined, Post 131 * Change 
Firm is significantly negative, suggesting that change firms decreased transfers to low 
q segments after SFAS 131 to a greater extent than did no-change firms. In column 3, 
when transfers to high q segments are examined, Post 131 * Change Firm is 
significantly positive, suggesting that change firms increased transfers to high q 
segments after SFAS 131 to a greater extent than did no-change firms. Finally, in 
column 4, when Signed Transfer is examined, Post 131 * Change Firm is significantly 
positive, suggesting that change firms experienced greater improvement of capital 
allocation efficiency in the post-SFAS 131 period relative to the pre-SFAS 131 period 
than did no-change firms.  
 
5.2. Endogeneity of a Firm’s Reporting Choice 
    The above analyses assume that the adoption of SFAS 131 is an exogenous 
change in disclosure quality of segment information. In spite of the mandatory nature 
of SFAS 131, however, if managers can still exercise discretion in applying the 
standard, the change vs. no-change classification occurs at least partially due to 
strategic considerations by managers. Though discretion exercised under SFAS 131 is 
believed to be lower than that under SFAS 14, a selection bias could arise if a firm’s 
reporting choice following SFAS 131 (i.e., whether or not to change its segment 
definitions) is correlated with firm characteristics which are also expected to influence 
capital allocation efficiency.  
    A potential candidate to be examined as an omitted variable (correlated with a 
firm’s reporting decision) is proprietary costs. Full disclosure does not arise when a 
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 firm’s disclosures provide proprietary information to competitors (e.g., Verrecchia 
1983; Darrough and Stoughton 1990; Wagenhofer 1990). Prior studies identify 
proprietary costs as a primary cause of firms aggregating segment information (Hayes 
and Lundholm 1996; Nagarajan and Sridhar1996; Harris 1998; Botosan and Stanford 
2005; Arya et al. 2008), which in turn may obscure efficient capital flows to the 
segments with the most promising opportunities. Therefore, proprietary costs may 
cause a bias in favor of my hypothesis if firms with high proprietary costs are more 
likely to aggregate their segments in a way that masks their efficient capital allocation 
and are also more likely to choose not to change their segment definitions on adopting 
SFAS 131.  
    Prior studies use industry concentration ratio and industry abnormal profit 
persistence (i.e., measures of industry competitiveness) as empirical proxies for 
proprietary costs. For example, Harris (1998) and Botosan and Stanford (2005) find 
that firms are more likely to hide their operations in industries with higher 
concentration ratio or higher abnormal profit persistence (i.e., less competitive 
industries) by aggregating segments so that they can protect abnormally high earnings 
trends in those industries. These studies suggest that firms tend to mask themselves to 
appear as if they underperform when they actually outperform their competitors. In 
addition, Ettredge et al. (2002) find that industry competitiveness is negatively 
associated with a firm’s lobbying position against SFAS 131.  
    To examine whether no-change firms are more populated with firms that have 
high proprietary costs, I too focus on the two commonly used measures of industry 
competitiveness. A firm’s concentration ratio is defined as the segment asset-weighted 
average Herfindahl index of industries in which the firm’s segments operate. Similarly, 
a firm’s persistence of abnormal profits is defined as the segment asset-weighted 
average persistence of abnormal profits of industries in which the firm’s segments 
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 operate (see appendix for additional details on variable construction). Because these 
measures are inversely related to industry competitiveness, if a firm’s reporting choice 
following SFAS 131 was not exogenous but strategic, the values of these two 
measures would be higher for no-change firms than for change firms. 
    However, Table 2 shows that in the pre-SFAS 131 period, the mean value of 
Concentration Ratio is not significantly different between change and no-change firms. 
Abnormal Profit Persistence is actually higher for change firms than for no-change 
firms, suggesting that change firms could have had a greater tendency to aggregate 
segments prior to SFAS 131, being forced to redefine their segments to comply with 
the new standard.19
    In addition, one may argue that a firm’s SFAS 131-related reporting decision is 
also likely to be correlated with its agency costs. If a firm with lower agency costs is 
more willing to become a change firm, the improved efficiency of capital allocation of 
change firms may be inaccurately attributed to SFAS 131. However, the results in 
Panel C of Table 3 do not suggest that change firms had lower agency costs prior to 
the adoption of SFAS 131. The negative coefficient on Change Firms in the Signed 
Transfer column suggests, instead, that change firms were characterized by greater 
agency costs than no-change firms.20
 
5.3. Multivariate Analyses of Capital Allocation Efficiency 
    As a way of addressing a potential bias arising from the endogeneity of a firm’s 
SFAS 131 reporting choice, I include in a regression equation a wide variety of control 
                                                 
19 An alternative way of measuring the competitive harm associated with SFAS 131 is to estimate 
cumulative market-adjusted daily returns over a three-day window around the date when the FASB first 
issued the Exposure Draft on SFAS 131 (Jan. 19, 1996). Firms that are more vulnerable to competitive 
harm caused by the management approach in segment reporting should suffer more negative returns 
during the three-day window around the announcement date. I do not find a significant difference in 
cumulative announcement returns between change and no-change firms in my sample. 
20 Firms with higher agency costs were more likely to have obscured their segment reporting until they 
were compelled to be more transparent.  
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 variables believed to be correlated with both reporting choice and capital allocation 
efficiency. Specifically, I estimate the following regression equation. 
 
Capital Allocation Efficiency (Weighted Average Signed Transfer) i,t 
= β0 + β1 Post 131 t + β2 Change Firm i + β3 Post 131 t * Change Firm i  
+ β4 Concentration Ratio i,t + β5 Abnormal Profit Persistence i,t + β6 Diversity i,t  
+ β7 Log (Market Value) i,t-1 + β8 Institutional Ownership i,t-1  
+ β9 Number of Analysts i,t-1 + e i,t 
 
    Because the regression is run on a variety of firm characteristics, the dependent 
variable is a firm-level measure of capital allocation efficiency, Weighted Average 
Signed Transfer. Concentration Ratio and Abnormal Profit Persistence, proxies for 
industry competitiveness, have been found to be associated with segment aggregation 
(see Harris (1998) and Botosan and Stanford (2005)). Segment aggregation in turn 
may mask capital allocation to appear less efficient than it actually is. Diversity 
proxies for agency costs arising from divisional managers’ power struggle. Table 2 
shows a significant difference in Diversity between change and no-change firms. 
Rajan et al. (2000) find that as diversity in resources (proxied for by segment assets) 
and opportunities (proxied for by segment q) increases, a firm tends to allocate 
internal capital less efficiently. Log (Market Value) is a logged value of market equity, 
proxying for firm size and measured at the beginning of a fiscal period. Table 2 shows 
a significant difference in market value of equity between change and no-change firms. 
If larger firms receive more attention from the market, firm size may be correlated 
with monitoring and thus capital allocation efficiency. Institutional Ownership and 
Number of Analysts are also used as control variables because they may work as a 
monitoring mechanism (see Appendix C for additional details on variable 
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 construction). 
    Table 4 reports the results of the regression analyses. In column 2, when the 
baseline model is estimated without control variables, the coefficient on Post 131 * 
Change Firm is 0.0120 and is significant. In column 3, when the extended model is 
estimated with control variables, the coefficient on Post 131 * Change Firm is 0.0131 
and is also significant.21 Column 4 reports results of an industry fixed effect model 
estimation. If industry dummies capture industry-specific time-invariant unobservable 
factors correlated with a firm’s reporting choice following SFAS 131, the industry 
fixed effect model will be useful in addressing a potential bias arising from firms’ self-
selection into the change or no-change group.22 The coefficient on Post 131 * Change 
Firm is again positive and statistically significant. Finally, column 5 reports the results 
when the firm fixed effect model is estimated. In column 5, the coefficient on Post 131 
* Change is also positive and statistically significant. All of these results support the 
hypothesis that change firms experienced greater improvement in capital allocation 
efficiency in the post-SFAS 131 period relative to the pre-SFAS 131 period than did 
no-change firms.23
 
5.4. Capital Allocation Efficiency and Firm Value 
    As discussed earlier, I use Signed Transfer as a measure of capital allocation 
efficiency. The assumption behind this measure is that transfers of capital from low q 
segments to high q segments are more value-enhancing than transfers of capital from 
                                                 
21 The VIF (variance inflation factor) for each variable is between 1and 3, suggesting that 
multicollinearity is not a serious problem. 
22 Industry dummies are defined based on a two-digit SIC code. 
23 One may argue that the estimator that captures the difference in differences in capital allocation 
efficiency would be overestimated if some macroeconomic changes in the post-SFAS 131 period (e.g., 
the late 1990’s dot-com bubble) caused no-change firms’ capital allocation to appear less efficient in the 
post-SFAS 131 period than in the pre-SFAS 131 period if the firms concealed their operations in the 
booming industries by segment aggregation. To mitigate this concern, I carry out a pre-and-post 
analysis using a sample of change firms alone and find that change firms experienced a significant 
increase in capital allocation efficiency after SFAS 131. 
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 Table 4. Regression of Weighted Average Signed Transfer 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Baseline Model Extended Model Industry Fixed Effect Firm Fixed Effect
Weighted Average Weighted Average Weighted Average Weighted Average
Signed Transfer Signed Transfer Signed Transfer Signed Transfer
Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat
Intercept 0.0038 0.0327 0.0309 0.1730
1.71* 1.91* 1.61 1.82*
Post 131 -0.0070 -0.0074 -0.0081 -0.0088
-2.07** -2.00** -2.14** -2.15**
Change Firm -0.0040 -0.0048 -0.0056
-1.17 -1.37 -1.55
Post 131 * Change Firm 0.0120 0.0131 0.0150 0.0117
2.31** 2.35** 2.70*** 2.05**
Concentration Ratio -0.0166 -0.0145 -0.0118
-2.02** -1.64 -0.98
Abnormal Profit Persistence -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0013
-0.32 -0.37 0.80
Diversity -0.0206 -0.0215 -0.0336
-2.87*** -2.96*** -1.77*
Log (Market Value) -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0084
-0.95 -0.73 -1.73*
Institutional Ownership -0.0033 -0.0035 0.0516
-0.58 -0.56 2.63***
Number of Analysts 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0015
0.50 0.40 -2.11**
Industry Dummies Included
Firm Dummies Included
No. of Obs. 1,941 1,663 1,663 1,663
Adj R-Squared 0.0017 0.0058 0.0195 0.1812  
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Table 4. (Continued) 
 
 
 
Table 4 reports the results of regression analyses when Weighted Average Signed Transfer is used as a dependent variable. See Appendix C for 
variable definitions. All computed variables are Winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles in each pre- and post-SFAS 131 sample. T-
statistics are estimated using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 
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 high q segments to low q segments. To investigate whether Signed Transfer is a valid 
measure of capital allocation efficiency, I first examine whether Weighted Average 
Signed Transfer is a good predictor of change in firm value, proxied for by q Change, 
Industry-adjusted q Change, and Market- and Benchmark-adjusted Annual Returns. A 
firm’s q Change is computed as the ratio of the firm’s q measured at the end of a fiscal 
period to the firm’s q measured at the beginning of the same period. Industry-adjusted 
q Change is computed as the firm’s q Change minus the median q Change of single-
segment firms that operate in the firm’s industry. Market-adjusted Annual Return is 
computed by compounding the firm’s monthly returns adjusted by market returns. 
Benchmark-adjusted Annual Return 1 is computed by compounding the firm’s 
monthly returns adjusted by size and book-to-market. Benchmark-adjusted Annual 
Return 2 is computed by compounding the firm’s monthly returns adjusted by size, 
book-to-market, and momentum (see appendix for additional details on variable 
construction). 
    Using all multiple-to-multiple firms as the sample, Table 5 shows that after 
controlling for earnings, change in earnings, time-invariant firm-specific 
characteristics, and cross-sectional common errors, Weighted Average Signed 
Transfer is significantly positive for various proxy variables representing a change in 
firm value. This result validates the use of Signed Transfer as a measure of capital 
allocation efficiency. 
 
5.5. The Role of Internal Monitoring 
    Given that SFAS 131-type segment information was already available to 
managers and boards of directors before the adoption of SFAS 131, the above results 
would be surprising if firms have strong internal monitoring. While this study suggests 
that disclosure quality improves investment efficiency by strengthening external 
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Table 5. Value Relevance of Transfer 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Industry-adjusted Market-adjusted Benchmark-adjusted Benchmark-adjusted
q  Change Annual Return Annual Return 1 Annual Return 2
Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat
Weighted Average Signed Transfer 0.7715 0.7604 0.7192 0.8511 0.8548
4.13*** 3.86*** 2.25** 3.08*** 3.01***
Earnings -0.1554 -0.0708 0.6321 0.5030 0.3045
-0.83 -0.34 1.95* 1.73* 1.04
Change in Earnings 0.2237 0.1332 0.4665 0.5341 0.5976
1.56 0.82 2.17** 2.91*** 3.13***
Firm Dummies Included Included Included Included Included
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included
No. of Obs. 1,709 1,515 1,708 1,633 1,611
Adj R-Squared 0.0556 0.0041 0.2173 0.1268 0.1073
q Change
 
Table 5 reports the results of regression analyses when various variables representing a change in firm value are used as dependent variables. 
See Appendix C for variable definitions. All computed variables are Winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles in each pre- and post-
SFAS 131 sample. T-statistics are estimated using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 
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 monitoring, it would be also interesting to examine how the enhanced disclosure (as a 
mechanism to elevate external monitoring) interacts with internal monitoring to 
achieve higher investment efficiency. To answer this question, I conduct additional 
analyses by dividing the sample firms into subsamples of high vs. low internal 
monitoring. 
    More specifically, if managers under strong internal monitoring already allocated 
internal capital efficiently before the adoption of SFAS 131, the effect of the enhanced 
disclosure under SFAS 131 on capital allocation efficiency would be minimal for 
firms with strong corporate governance. Then the observed improvement in capital 
allocation efficiency after the adoption of SFAS 131 would be achieved primarily or to 
a greater extent by firms with weak corporate governance relative to firms with strong 
corporate governance. To test for the role of internal monitoring, in Panel A of Table 6, 
I focus specifically on the independence of boards of directors. Given that boards of 
directors were able to access SFAS 131-type segment information even before the 
adoption of SFAS 131, board independence should be the most relevant corporate 
governance variable that interacts with enhanced disclosures in inducing more 
efficient capital allocation after SFAS 131.  
    To examine the role of board independence, I use the data on officers and boards 
of directors collected from Compact Disclosure’s June CD-ROMs.24 A firm is 
classified as a firm with high (low) board independence if the firm belongs to the top 
(bottom) 40% in a distribution of board independence (i.e., the proportion of outside 
directors on the board who are not affiliated with the firm) measured during the four-
year period before the adoption of SFAS 131. Panel A of Table 6 reports the results. In 
column 2, when I focus on a subsample of firms with low board independence, Post 
                                                 
24 I thank Partha Sengupta for providing me with hand-collected data on officers and boards of 
directors from Compact Disclosure’s June CD-ROMs. 
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Table 6. Interactive Effect of Internal Monitoring 
 
Panel A. Board Independence
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Low Board High Board
Independence Independence Combined
Subsample Subsample Subsample
(weak Governance) (Strong Governance)
Weighted Average Weighted Average Weighted Average
Signed Transfer Signed Transfer Signed Transfer
Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat
Intercept 0.0161 -0.0215 0.0128
0.48 -0.66 0.59
Post 131 -0.0147 -0.0013 -0.0153
-1.62 -0.25 -1.75*
Change Firm -0.027 -0.0025 -0.0291
-2.78*** -0.44 -3.39***
Post 131 * Change Firm 0.0352 0.0068 0.0369
2.46** 0.92 2.75***
Board Independence -0.0147
-1.83*
Post 131 * Board Independence 0.0153
1.50
Change Firm * Board Independence 0.0289
2.86***
Post 131 * Change Firm * Board Independence -0.0317
-2.07**
Concentration Ratio -0.0051 -0.0196 -0.0118
-0.24 -1.46 -1.00
Abnormal Profit Persistence -0.0007 0 -0.0004
-0.55 0.01 -0.78
Diversity -0.0167 -0.0108 -0.0185
-0.93 -1.03 -1.89*
Log (Market Value) 0.0000 0.0019 0.0006
0.00 1.25 0.54
Institutional Ownership 0.0075 -0.0157 -0.0054
0.37 -1.61 -0.59
Number of Analysts 0.0002 -0.0001 0.0001
0.29 -0.26 0.49
Industry Dummies Included Included Included
No. of Obs. 399 590 989
Adj R-Squared -0.0071 0.0959 0.0158  
 
Panel A of Table 6 reports the results of regression analyses when Weighted Average Signed 
Transfer is used as a dependent variable. Internal monitoring is measured by using the 
independence of boards of directors. See Appendix C for variable definitions. All computed 
variables are Winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles in each pre- and post-SFAS 
131 sample. T-statistics are estimated using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 
 32
  
Table 6. (Continued) 
 
Panel B. Gompers et al.'s (2003) G-index 
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Low G High G Combined
Subsample Subsample Subsample
(Strong Governance) (Weak Governance)
Weighted Average Weighted Average Weighted Average
Signed Transfer Signed Transfer Signed Transfer
Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat
Intercept 0.0957 -0.0274 -0.0074
1.34 -0.44 -0.2
Post 131 0.0095 -0.0018 0.0069
1.04 -0.31 0.83
Change Firm 0.0105 -0.0015 0.0062
0.97 -0.27 0.7
Post 131 * Change Firm 0.0052 0.0066 0.0023
0.38 0.84 0.18
High G 0.0105
1.4
Post 131 * High G -0.0075
-0.77
Change Firm * High G -0.0068
-0.68
Post 131 * Change Firm * High G 0.0032
0.21
Concentration Ratio 0.0335 -0.0255 -0.0082
1.28 -1.43 -0.58
Abnormal Profit Persistence -0.0012 0 -0.0007
-1.07 -0.01 -1.02
Diversity 0.0224 -0.0169 -0.0101
0.85 -1.51 -0.95
Log (Market Value) -0.0067 0.0016 -0.0004
-1.90* 0.56 -0.22
Institutional Ownership 0.0083 0.0229 0.0226
0.39 1.28 2.03**
Number of Analysts 0.0016 -0.0006 -0.0001
1.87* -1.43 -0.21
Industry Dummies Included Included Included
No. of Obs. 173 268 441
Adj R-Squared 0.1634 0.1336 0.1195  
 
Panel B of Table 6 reports the results of regression analyses when Weighted Average Signed 
Transfer is used as a dependent variable. Internal monitoring is measured by using Gompers et 
al.’s (2003) G-index. See Appendix C for variable definitions. All computed variables are 
Winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles in each pre- and post-SFAS 131 sample. T-
statistics are estimated using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.
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Table 6. (Continued) 
 
Panel C. Bebchuk et al.'s (2009) E-index 
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Low E High E Combined
Subsample Subsample Subsample
(Strong Governance) (Weak Governance)
Weighted Average Weighted Average Weighted Average
Signed Transfer Signed Transfer Signed Transfer
Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat
Intercept 0.0399 -0.0413 0.02
0.60 -0.79 0.48
Post 131 0.0102 -0.0048 0.0107
1.6 -0.88 1.65*
Change Firm 0.0073 0.0005 0.0107
0.98 0.09 1.57
Post 131 * Change Firm -0.0027 0.0107 -0.0049
-0.26 1.43 -0.47
High E 0.0061
1.07
Post 131 * High E -0.0128
-1.52
Change Firm * High E -0.0072
-0.83
Post 131 * Change Firm * High E 0.0119
0.92
Concentration Ratio 0.0171 -0.0223 -0.0078
0.81 -1.56 -0.64
Abnormal Profit Persistence -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0003
-0.31 -0.53 -0.51
Diversity 0.0087 -0.0171 -0.0132
0.51 -1.4 -1.36
Log (Market Value) -0.0029 0.0023 -0.0015
-0.97 0.93 -0.77
Institutional Ownership 0.0062 0.0117 0.015
0.39 0.78 1.56
Number of Analysts 0.0006 -0.0005 0.0002
0.94 -1.08 0.61
Industry Dummies Included Included Included
No. of Obs. 308 281 589
Adj R-Squared 0.1038 0.1610 0.0812  
 
Panel C of Table 6 reports the results of regression analyses when Weighted Average Signed 
Transfer is used as a dependent variable. Internal monitoring is measured by using Bebchuk et 
al.’s (2009) E-index. See Appendix C for variable definitions. All computed variables are 
Winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles in each pre- and post-SFAS 131 sample. T-
statistics are estimated using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 
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 131 * Change Firm is significantly positive, suggesting that enhanced disclosures 
under SFAS 131 improved external monitoring and thereby capital allocation 
efficiency for firms with weak internal monitoring. In contrast, in column 3, when I 
focus on a subsample of firms with high board independence, Post 131 * Change Firm 
is not. significant, failing to provide evidence that SFAS 131 improved capital 
allocation efficiency for firms with strong internal monitoring. Finally, in column 4, 
when the two subsamples are combined, Post 131 * Change Firm is significantly 
positive, but the three-way interaction, Post 131 * Change Firm * Board Independence, 
is significantly negative, suggesting that the strength of internal monitoring moderates 
the effect of SFAS 131 on capital allocation efficiency. In other words, the positive 
effect of SFAS 131 on capital allocation efficiency was greater for firms with more 
severe agency problems (i.e., firms with weak internal monitoring) than for firms with 
less severe agency problems (i.e., firms with strong internal monitoring).25  
    Panels B and C of Table 6 report the results when Gompers et al.’s (2003) 
governance index (G index in Panel B) and Bebchuk et al.’s (2009) entrenchment 
index (E index in Panel C) are used as alternative proxies for corporate governance. 
These indices proxy for the level of shareholder rights as reflected in the governance 
provisions followed by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (i.e., the IRRC 
provisions). By construction, higher value of G or E index represents weaker 
protection of shareholder rights or greater extent of management entrenchment. 
Similar to board independence, a firm is classified as a firm with high (low) G or E if 
the firm belongs to the top (bottom) 40% in a distribution of G or E measured during 
                                                 
25 For December year-end firms, I use the average of board independence computed across 1994 to 
1997. For non-December year-end firms, I use the average of board independence computed across 
1995 to 1998. Because the data of boards of directors cover only a small fraction of firms in my 
segment database each year, merging the two data sets decreases sample size and reduces statistical 
power. To maximize usable observations, if a firm’s board information is not available in a year, I 
substitute data from the closest subsequent year. Without this treatment, results are all similar except 
that the coefficient on Post 131 * Change Firm * Board Independence in column 4 of Table 4 falls short 
of conventional significance due to a lack of power. 
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 the four-year period before the adoption of SFAS 131.26 Using these proxies for 
corporate governance, however, I do not find evidence that internal monitoring 
significantly moderates the effect of SFAS 131 on capital allocation efficiency 
possibly because these proxies are not very relevant to managers’ capital allocation 
decisions or because the regression models suffer a lack of statistical power. (Note that 
the magnitude and direction of the coefficients on key variables, though not 
statistically significant, are consistent with those in Panel A of Table 6.)  
 
5.6. The Effect of SFAS 131 on Firm Value 
    So far this study has reported that 1) change firms experienced greater 
improvement in capital allocation efficiency than did no-change firms after SFAS 131; 
and 2) firm value is increasing in capital allocation efficiency. Taken together, these 
results suggest that change firms should experience a greater increase in firm value in 
the post-SFAS 131 period relative to the pre-SFAS 131 period than no-change firms. 
However, SFAS 131 could negatively influence firm value if more disaggregated 
segment disclosures cause competitive harm. Harris (1998) and Botosan and Stanford 
(2005) find that firms are more likely to hide their operations in less competitive 
industries to protect the abnormal earnings trends in those industries. Disclosures of 
such operations mandated under SFAS 131 could be detrimental to firm value. 
    To carry out a difference in differences analysis of firm value, Tobin’s q 
(measured at the end of a fiscal period) is regressed on Post 131, Change Firm, and 
Post 131 * Change Firm, along with a variety of control variables likely to be 
correlated with both Tobin’s q and the firm’s SFAS 131-related reporting decision 
                                                 
26 For December year-end firms, I use the average of G (or E) computed across 1994 to 1997. For non-
December year-end firms, I use the average of G (or E) computed across 1995 to 1998. I use Gompers 
et al’s (2003) G index downloaded from http://www.som.yale.edu/faculty/am859/data.html and 
Bebchuk et al’s (2009) E index data downloaded from 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml. 
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 (see Appendix C for additional details on variable construction). Unlike the measure 
of capital allocation efficiency, Tobin’s q, as a measure of firm value, is computed 
using firm-level data, not segment-level data, and thus is not subject to the potential 
bias arising from a differential propensity of segment aggregation between change and 
no-change firms. 
    In addition, to further examine the role of proprietary costs in moderating the 
effect of SFAS 131 on firm value, in Panel A of Table 7, I focus on subsamples of 
firms facing relatively high (low) proprietary costs (defined as firms belonging to the 
top (bottom) 40% of the Abnormal Profit Persistence distribution). In column 2, when 
the sample is limited to a subset of firms with low proprietary costs, Post 131 * 
Change Firm is significantly positive. In contrast, in column 3, when the sample is 
limited to a subset of firms with high proprietary costs, Post 131 * Change Firm is 
insignificant. Finally, in column 4, when the two subsamples are combined, Post 131 * 
Change Firm is significantly positive, but the three-way interaction Post 131 * Change 
Firm * Proprietary Cost is significantly negative. Of interest too is the significantly 
positive coefficient on Change Firms * Proprietary Costs, that captures the 
effectiveness of the change firms’ pre-SFAS 131 segment reporting choices in 
protecting their competitive advantage. Consistent with earlier results, the coefficient 
on Weighted Average Signed Transfer is significantly positive. Taken together, these 
results suggest that SFAS 131 reduced agency costs and increased firm value, but this 
effect is moderated by proprietary costs.27
    Panel B of Table 7 reports the results when I use concentration ratio as an 
alternative proxy for proprietary costs. If a firm operated in more concentrated (and 
thereby less competitive) industries prior to the adoption of SFAS 131, the firm should 
                                                 
27 When I conduct a pre-and-post analysis using a sample of change firms alone, I find a significant 
increase in firm value after SFAS 131 for firms with low proprietary costs, but do not find a significant 
increase in firm value for firms with high proprietary costs.  
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 Table 7. Regression of Firm Value 
Panel A. Proprietary Cost Defined by Abnormal Profit Persistence
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Low Proprietary High Proprietary Combined
Cost Subsample Cost Subsample Subsample
Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat
Intercept 1.256 0.8336 1.4474
2.15** 1.46 3.58***
Post 131 -0.0814 0.0116 -0.0831
-0.94 0.14 -0.96
Change Firm -0.1857 -0.0005 -0.1509
-2.08** -0.01 -1.79*
Post 131 * Change Firm 0.3770 -0.0020 0.3625
2.89*** -0.02 2.74***
Proprietary Cost -0.0892
-1.05
Post 131 * Proprietary Cost 0.1309
1.09
Change Firm * Proprietary Cost 0.1881
1.66*
Post 131 * Change Firm * Proprietary Cost -0.3676
-2.09**
Weighted Average Signed Transfer 1.6136 1.4242 1.2898
1.64 1.57 1.85*
Log (Asset) 0.017 0.035 0.0073
0.59 1.15 0.36
ROA 2.0817 2.0294 2.1322
3.47*** 3.98*** 5.04***
Investment Ratio 1.8788 0.1022 0.9575
3.34*** 0.18 2.18**
Diversification -0.0795 -0.0379 -0.0723
-1.75* -0.74 -2.03**
Institutional Ownership -1.0559 -0.5535 -0.8008
-6.97*** -3.93*** -7.22***
Number of Analysts 0.0585 0.032 0.0504
6.97*** 4.45*** 8.01***
Industry Dummies Included Included Included
No. of Obs. 611 620 1,231
Adj R-Squared 0.3659 0.2658 0.2843
q q q
 
 
Panel A of Table 7 reports the results of regression analyses when Tobin’s q is used as a 
dependent variable. Proprietary costs are measured by using the persistence of abnormal 
profits of industries in which segments operate. See Appendix C for variable definitions. All 
computed variables are Winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles in each pre- and 
post-SFAS 131 sample. T-statistics are estimated using heteroscedasticity-robust standard 
errors. 
 38
 Table 7. (Continued) 
Panel B. Proprietary Cost Defined by Industry Concentration (using Compustat Firms)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Low Proprietary High Proprietary Combined
Cost Subsample Cost Subsample Subsample
Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat
Intercept 0.8296 1.6995 1.3773
1.82* 3.19*** 3.52***
Post 131 -0.0278 -0.0466 -0.0634
-0.34 -0.53 -0.76
Change Firm -0.1099 -0.0216 -0.049
-1.51 -0.26 -0.68
Post 131 * Change Firm 0.2369 -0.0026 0.2653
2.05** -0.02 2.18**
Proprietary Cost 0.0203
0.24
Post 131 * Proprietary Cost 0.0181
0.15
Change Firm * Proprietary Cost 0.0018
0.02
Post 131 * Change Firm * Proprietary Cost -0.2397
-1.38
Weighted Average Signed Transfer 0.6958 1.0798 1.1018
0.99 1.10 1.76*
Log (Asset) 0.0261 -0.0166 0.0057
1.06 -0.63 0.29
ROA 5.1683 1.2779 2.6828
6.90*** 1.83* 5.52***
Investment Ratio 0.4935 1.9672 0.9061
0.89 2.06** 2.17**
Diversification -0.1097 -0.0054 -0.0734
-2.61*** -0.12 -2.13**
Institutional Ownership -0.784 -0.4532 -0.7525
-5.64*** -2.82*** -6.75***
Number of Analysts 0.0461 0.0468 0.0483
6.63*** 5.03*** 7.86***
Industry Dummies Included Included Included
No. of Obs. 667 576 1,243
Adj R-Squared 0.4688 0.3129 0.3165
q q q
 
 
Panel B of Table 7 reports the results of regression analyses when Tobin’s q is used as a 
dependent variable. Proprietary costs are measured by using the Herfindahl index of industries 
in which segments operate based on a sample of firms in Compustat. See Appendix C for 
variable definitions. All computed variables are Winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth 
percentiles in each pre- and post-SFAS 131 sample. T-statistics are estimated using 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 
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 Table 7. (Continued) 
Panel C. Proprietary Cost Defined by Industry Concentration (from U.S. Economic Census)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Low Proprietary High Proprietary Combined
Cost Subsample Cost Subsample Subsample
Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat
Intercept 2.622 1.4776 1.4157
3.65*** 1.83* 2.56**
Post 131 -0.1141 0.0574 -0.0784
-1.35 0.47 -0.85
Change Firm -0.037 -0.0015 -0.0449
-0.45 -0.01 -0.53
Post 131 * Change Firm 0.1106 -0.0924 0.1041
0.99 -0.57 0.86
Proprietary Cost 0.0114
0.11
Post 131 * Proprietary Cost 0.127
0.84
Change Firm * Proprietary Cost -0.0256
-0.2
Post 131 * Change Firm * Proprietary Cost -0.2031
-0.99
Weighted Average Signed Transfer 2.4261 1.5181 2.1138
1.82* 1.24 2.24**
Log (Asset) -0.0785 0.0098 0.0015
-2.16** 0.25 0.05
ROA 2.7282 3.138 2.5164
4.08*** 2.86*** 4.16***
Investment Ratio 1.6431 0.0144 1.1419
2.52** 0.01 1.75*
Diversification -0.012 -0.0695 -0.0465
-0.29 -1.19 -1.19
Institutional Ownership -0.2291 -1.1191 -0.7245
-1.39 -5.99*** -5.50***
Number of Analysts 0.0596 0.0586 0.0578
4.85*** 5.31*** 6.78***
Industry Dummies Included Included Included
No. of Obs. 489 459 948
Adj R-Squared 0.4852 0.3759 0.3445
q q q
 
 
Panel C of Table 7 reports the results of regression analyses when Tobin’s q is used as a 
dependent variable. Proprietary costs are measured by using the Herfindahl index of industries 
in which segments operate based on the 1997 U.S. Economic Census. See Appendix C for 
variable definitions. All computed variables are Winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth 
percentiles in each pre- and post-SFAS 131 sample. T-statistics are estimated using 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 
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 have lost greater advantage after the adoption of SFAS 131 because enhanced 
disclosures could cause more severe competition. To examine whether the above 
results hold in this alternative approach, using all Compustat firms, I compute a firm’s 
asset-weighted average of Herfindahl index of four-digit SIC industries where the 
firm’s segments operate in 1997 (i.e., a year in the pre-SFAS 131 period). Then I 
classify a firm as a firm facing high (low) proprietary costs if the firm belongs to the 
top (bottom) 40% in a distribution of the asset-weighted average of 1997 segment 
Herfindhal index. When replicating the above analyses using this alternative approach, 
Panel B of Table 7 shows that Post 131 * Change Firm is significantly positive in a 
subsample of firms with low proprietary costs but is insignificantly negative in a 
subsample of firms with high proprietary costs, consistent with the results in columns 
2 and 3 of Panel A. However, I do not find that the coefficient on Post 131 * Change 
Firm in a subsample of firms with low proprietary costs is statistically significantly 
higher than that in a subsample of firms with high proprietary costs, possibly because 
of a lack of power.  
    Panel C of Table 7 also reports the results when I use concentration ratio as an 
alternative proxy for proprietary costs. But in Panel C, instead of calculating 
Herfindahl index by using Compustat firms, I use Herfindahl index hand-collected 
from the 1997 U.S. Economic Census to classify firms as ones with high vs. low 
proprietary costs. Ali et al. (2009) report that concentration ratio from Compustat is a 
poor proxy for industry competition because Compustat only covers public firms in an 
industry.28 Given that private firms are not affected by SFAS 131 and thus can take 
advantage of the enhanced disclosures of public firms to erode their competitive 
advantage, the omission of private firms in measuring industry concentration (as a 
                                                 
28 Ali et al. (2009) reports that the correlation between the Herfindahl index calculated by using  
Compustat firms and the Herfindhal index from the U.S. Economic Census is only 13%.  
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 proxy for proprietary costs) could cause significant measurement errors. However, the 
weakness of this approach is that the U.S. Economic Census only provides Hefindahl 
indices for manufacturing industries, reducing the usable sample size and thereby the 
power of the test.  
    The 1997 U.S. Economic Census provides the value of shipments along with 
Hefindahl indices calculated using 50 largest firms in each six-digit North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS) industries. To link this six-digit NAICS-
defined Herfindahl index to my segment data with four-digit SIC industries, following 
the algorithm developed by Ali et al. (2009), I weight the Herfindhal index of the 
component six-digit NAICS industries by the square of their share of the shipments of 
the broader four-digit SIC industry. Then similar to above approach, I compute a 
firm’s asset-weighted average of Herfindahl index of four-digit industries where the 
firm’s segments operate in 1997 (i.e., a year in the pre-SFAS 131 period). Then I 
classify a firm as a firm facing high (low) proprietary costs if the firm belongs to the 
top (bottom) 40% in a distribution of the asset-weighted average of 1997 segment 
Herfindhal index. When replicating the above analyses using this alternative approach, 
Panel C of Table 7 shows that Post 131 * Change Firm is insignificantly positive in a 
subsample of firms with low proprietary costs, while it is insignificantly negative in a 
subsample of firms with high proprietary costs. The three-way interaction, Post 131 * 
Change Firm * and Proprietary Cost, is negative but not significant, failing to provide 
evidence that proprietary costs moderate the effect of SFAS 131 on firm value, 
possibly because of a lack of power. 
 
6. Robustness Analyses 
6.1. An Alternative Measure of Capital Allocation Efficiency 
    As a proxy for cross-segment transfers, the firm- and industry-adjusted 
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 investment ratio has been criticized in that it assumes that the investment opportunities 
facing a segment as a part of multiple-segment firms are identical to those of single-
segment firms in the same industry (Maksimovi and Phillips 2002 ; Billett and Mauer 
2003; Berger and Hann 2003). Billett and Mauer (2003) and Berger and Hann (2003), 
therefore, suggest a more direct, alternative measure of capital allocation based on the 
difference between a segment’s capital expenditures and its cash flows (i.e., excess 
capital expenditures). The idea behind this measure is that a segment’s excess capital 
expenditures represent a portion of the segment’s investments subsidized by other 
segments or external financing. 
    Table 8 reports the results of regression analyses when an alternative measure of 
capital allocation efficiency based on excess capital expenditures, Weighted Average 
Signed Subsidy, is used as a dependent variable (see appendix for additional details on 
variable construction). Results are consistent with those documented earlier. In 
columns 2 through 5, Post 131 * Change Firm is significantly positive in every 
specification, again supporting the hypothesis that change firms experienced greater 
improvement in capital allocation efficiency in the post-SFAS 131 period relative to 
the pre-SFAS 131 period than did a control sample of no-change firms. 
 
6.2. Two-Stage Analyses to Control for Self-Selection Biases 
    The data do not suggest that the results documented by this study are driven by 
self-selection biases, which could work in favor of my hypotheses if no-change firms 
aggregated their segments in a way that masked real capital allocation efficiency to a 
greater extent than did change firms. However, I conduct several sensitivity analyses 
to ensure that my results are robust to this possibility. 
    Columns 2 and 3 of Table 9 report results using the instrumental variable 
approach to capture change firms. In the first stage (column 2), using the sample firms 
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 Table 8. Regression of Weighted Average Signed Subsidy 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Baseline Model Extended Model Industry Fixed Effect Firm Fixed Effect
Weighted Average Weighted Average Weighted Average Weighted Average
Signed Subsidy Signed Subsidy Signed Subsidy Signed Subsidy
Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat
Intercept 0.0117 0.0552 0.0525 0.0823
3.49*** 1.36 1.12 0.51
Post 131 -0.0096 -0.0052 -0.0073 -0.0085
-1.32 -0.79 -1.08 -1.48
Change Firm -0.0118 -0.0102 -0.0071
-2.70*** -2.33** -1.39
Post 131 * Change Firm 0.0298 0.0277 0.0305 0.0215
2.50** 2.23** 2.43** 1.92*
Concentration Ratio -0.0004 -0.0042 0.0074
-0.02 -0.22 0.37
Abnormal Profit Persistence -0.0001 -0.0004 0.0014
-0.16 -0.49 1.36
Diversity -0.0212 -0.0260 -0.0541
-1.60 -1.70* -1.67*
Log (Market Value) -0.0017 -0.0014 -0.0037
-0.90 -0.62 -0.45
Institutional Ownership -0.0263 -0.0289 0.0639
-2.44** -2.42** 1.67*
Number of Analysts 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0025
1.26 0.95 -1.99**
Industry Dummies Included
Firm Dummies Included
No. of Obs. 1,855 1,594 1,594 1,594
Adj R-Squared 0.0025 0.0042 0.0083 0.3689  
 
 44
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. (Continued) 
 
 
 
Table 8 reports the results of regression analyses when Weighted Average Signed Subsidy is used as a dependent variable. See Appendix C for 
variable definitions. All computed variables are Winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles in each pre- and post-SFAS 131 sample. T-
statistics are estimated using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 
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 Table 9. Two-Stage Analyses of Weighted Average Signed Transfer 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Weighted Average Weighted Average
 Signed Transfer  Signed Transfer
Coef./t-stat Coef./z-stat Coef./z-stat Coef./z-stat
Intercept -0.6739 0.0605 -7.7032 0.0731
-4.24*** 1.73* -17.28*** 0.69
Post 131 0.0126 -0.0282 -0.0098
0.53 -2.86*** -1.94*
Change Firm -0.0056 -0.0104
-0.14 -1.95*
Post 131 * Change Firm 0.0594 0.0156
2.99*** 2.09**
Concentration Ratio 0.0061 -0.0136 -0.0934 -0.0147
0.08 -1.51 -0.50 -1.24
Abnormal Profit Persistence 0.0140 -0.0008 0.0275 0.0043
2.14** -0.93 1.77* 0.69
Diversity -0.0585 -0.0213 -0.0304 -0.0298
-0.89 -2.79*** -0.19 -2.87***
Log (Market Value) 0.0509 -0.0022 0.1551 -0.0023
5.92*** -0.90 7.29*** -0.41
Institutional Ownership -0.0345 -0.0041 -0.1483 -0.0085
-0.60 -0.66 -1.07 -0.80
Number of Analysts -0.0038 0.0003 -0.0126 0.0003
-1.45 0.88 -2.01** 0.53
Big Auditor 0.1577 0.2466
3.66*** 2.17**
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included
No. of Obs. 1,663 1,663 2,004 1,623
Adj (or Psuedo) R-Squared 0.1016 0.0194 0.0805 0.0661
Instrumental Variable Approach Propensity Score Matching Approach
Change Firm Change Firm
 
 46
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. (Continued) 
 
 
 
Table 9 reports the results of two-stage analyses when Weighted Average Signed Transfer is used as a dependent variable. See Appendix C for 
variable definitions. All computed variables are Winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles in each pre- and post-SFAS 131 sample. In 
the first stage, t-statistics are estimated using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. In the second stage, z-statistics are estimated using 
bootstrap standard errors obtained by 1,000 replications. In Column 4, pseudo R2 is reported for the probit model. In Column 5, the weighted 
average of adjusted R2 in each block regression is reported for the propensity score matching approach. 
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 whose Weighted Average Signed Transfer is not missing, I run a linear regression of 
Change Firm on every exogenous variable to be used in the second stage along with 
Big Auditor, a proxy for audit quality likely to influence a firm’s SFAS 131-related 
reporting decision without being directly correlated with capital allocation. Big 
Auditor takes a value of 1 if Arthur Andersen, Arthur Young, Coopers & Lybrand, 
Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers or Touche Ross 
was listed by Compustat as the firm’s auditor and 0 otherwise. In the second stage 
(column 3), I run a linear regression of Weighted Average Signed Transfer as before, 
replacing Change Firm and Post 131 * Change Firm by values obtained using the 
predicted value of Change Firm from the first stage. Since this procedure produces 
biased standard errors for coefficients, statistical significance is tested by z-value 
generated by bootstrap standard errors obtained by 1,000 replications. Column 3 
shows that Post 131 * Change Firm is again significantly positive, consistent with 
earlier results. 
    Columns 4 and 5 report results when the propensity score matching approach is 
employed. In the first stage (column 4), I estimate a probit model to produce a 
probability that a firm chooses to be a change firm conditional on a vector of firm 
characteristics. This probability is the propensity score based on which change and no-
change firms are to be matched. The propensity score theorem states that if the 
assignment to a treatment or control group is random conditional on a vector of firm 
characteristics, the assignment is also random conditional on the propensity score. 
This implies that matching of change firms with no-change firms based on comparable 
propensity scores would eliminate a selection bias arising from the firm characteristics 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). While matching can be performed in various ways, I 
follow Dehejia and Wahba’s (1999, 2001) stratification matching method (see 
appendix for additional details on matching procedures). Column 5 shows matching 
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 estimators on each coefficient along with z-value generated by bootstrap standard 
errors obtained by 1,000 replication. Post 131 * Change Firm is again significantly 
positive. 
    Table 10 reports the results of two-stage analyses when Weighted Average 
Signed Subsidy is examined as an alternative measure of capital allocation efficiency. 
In columns 3 and 5, Post 131 * Change Firm is significantly positive again, supporting 
my hypothesis. Taken together, Tables 9 and 10 demonstrate that the results of this 
study are robust to a potential self-selection bias.29
 
6.3. Firm Value Analysis of Single-to-Multiple Firms 
    Given that Berger and Hann (2003) report a value decrease for single-to-multiple 
firms on adopting SFAS 131, of particular interest is whether their result can be 
explained by proprietary costs. To answer this question, I conduct a pre-and-post 
analysis of firm value for single-to-multiple firms and report the results in Table 11. 
Panel A shows the results when I classify a firm as a firm facing high (low) 
proprietary costs if the firm belongs to the top (bottom) 40% in a distribution of 
Abnormal Profit Persistence. In column 2, when the sample is limited to a subset of 
firms with low proprietary costs, Post 131 * Change Firm is not significant. In contrast, 
in column 3, when the sample is limited to a subset of firms with high proprietary 
costs, Post 131 * Change Firm is significantly negative. Finally, in column 5, when the 
two subsamples are combined, Post 131 * Change Firm is not significant, but Post 131 
* Change Firm * Proprietary Cost is significantly negative. 
    Panel B shows the results when I use an alternative proxy for propriety costs,
                                                 
29 Another way of addressing a selection bias is to use a variant of Heckman’s (1979) λ as a control 
function. I do not report the results from this approach (although consistent with the findings described 
earlier) because the mandatory nature of SFAS 131 implies that firms’ reporting decisions in the wake 
of SFAS 131 are not entirely discretionary, inconsistent with the assumption of Heckman’s (1979) 
model.   
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 Table 10. Two-Stage Analyses of Weighted Average Signed Subsidy 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage
Weighted Average Weighted Average
 Signed Subsidy  Signed Subsidy
Coef./t-stat Coef./z-stat Coef./z-stat Coef./z-stat
Intercept -0.7634 0.1144 -7.7032 0.2225
-4.68*** 1.54 -17.28*** 0.96
Post 131 0.0207 -0.0388 -0.0084
0.86 -1.68* -0.96
Change Firm 0.0151 -0.0190
0.19 -2.16**
Post 131 * Change Firm 0.0979 0.0318
2.22** 1.89*
Concentration Ratio 0.0021 -0.0017 -0.0934 -0.0016
0.03 -0.09 -0.5 -0.07
Abnormal Profit Persistence 0.0137 -0.0015 0.0275 0.0096
2.10** -1.06 1.77* 0.86
Diversity -0.0244 -0.0261 -0.0304 -0.0521
-0.36 -1.64 -0.19 -2.26**
Log (Market Value) 0.0545 -0.0051 0.1551 -0.0083
6.21*** -0.96 7.29*** -0.66
Institutional Ownership -0.0489 -0.0292 -0.1483 -0.0478
-0.84 -2.53** -1.07 -2.08**
Number of Analysts -0.0042 0.0008 -0.0126 0.0014
-1.57 1.35 -2.01** 1.03
Big Auditor 0.1744 0.2466
3.98*** 2.17**
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included
No. of Obs. 1,594 1,594 2,004 1,554
Adj R-Squared 0.1076 0.0066 0.0805 0.0358
Instrumental Variable Approach Propensity Score Matching Approach
Change Firm Change Firm
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Table 10. (Continued) 
 
 
 
Table 10 reports the results of two-stage analyses when Weighted Average Signed S is used as a dependent variable. See Appendix C for 
variable definitions. All computed variables are Winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles in each pre- and post-SFAS 131 sample. In 
the first stage, t-statistics are estimated using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. In the second stage, z-statistics are estimated using 
bootstrap standard errors obtained by 1,000 replications. In Column 4, pseudo R2 is reported for the probit model. In Column 5, the weighted 
average of adjusted R2 in each block regression is reported for the propensity score matching approach. 
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Table 11. Regression of Firm Value for Single-to-Multiple Firms 
 
Panel A. Proprietary Cost Defined by Abnormal Profit Persistence
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Low Proprietary High Proprietary Combined
Cost Subsample Cost Subsample Subsample
Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat
Intercept 3.6408 3.526 3.7931
5.47*** 4.91*** 7.65***
Post 131 -0.0753 -0.1982 -0.0474
-0.91 -2.92*** -0.59
Proprietary Cost -0.0500
-0.59
Post 131 * Proprietary Cost -0.1885
-1.84*
Log (Asset) -0.1095 -0.1023 -0.1147
-3.08*** -2.81*** -4.48***
ROA 0.9857 2.9881 1.6046
1.86* 5.52*** 3.99***
Investment Ratio 2.0295 0.0605 1.0147
3.32*** 0.13 2.71***
Diversification 0.0016 -0.1045 -0.032
0.02 -2.68*** -0.75
Institutional Ownership -0.1760 -0.5328 -0.3927
-0.88 -3.83*** -3.28***
Number of Analysts 0.0432 0.058 0.0526
4.60*** 6.17*** 7.81***
Industry Dummies Included Included Included
No. of Obs. 936 987 1,923
Adj R-Squared 0.1530 0.2657 0.1807
q q q
 
Panel A of Table 11 reports the results of regression analyses when Tobin’s q is used as a 
dependent variable in a sample of single-to-multiple firms. Proprietary costs are measured by 
using the persistence of abnormal profits of industries in which segments operate. See 
Appendix C for variable definitions. All computed variables are Winsorized at the first and 
ninety-ninth percentiles in each pre- and post-SFAS 131 sample. T-statistics are estimated 
using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 
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Table 11. (Continued) 
 
Panel B. Proprietary Cost Defined by Industry Concentration (using Compustat Firms)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Low Proprietary High Proprietary Combined
Cost Subsample Cost Subsample Subsample
Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat Coef./t-stat
Intercept 1.6922 2.7847 2.5426
2.15** 4.97*** 5.04***
Post 131 -0.1051 -0.1081 -0.0579
-1.26 -1.73* -0.73
Proprietary Cost -0.105
-1.39
Post 131 * Proprietary Cost -0.0887
-0.88
Log (Asset) -0.0026 -0.0678 -0.0485
-0.06 -2.29** -1.85*
ROA 1.5024 1.8402 1.8146
2.21** 3.09*** 4.13***
Investment Ratio 1.4851 3.4106 2.2422
3.64*** 3.33*** 4.41***
Diversification -0.0234 -0.1393 -0.0771
-0.4 -2.52** -1.94*
Institutional Ownership -0.2978 -0.6967 -0.5502
-1.51 -4.99*** -4.60***
Number of Analysts 0.0317 0.0775 0.0547
3.03*** 6.50*** 7.01***
Industry Dummies Included Included Included
No. of Obs. 986 1,003 1,989
Adj R-Squared 0.1813 0.2646 0.2131
q q q
 
Panel B of Table 11 reports the results of regression analyses when Tobin’s q is used as a 
dependent variable in a sample of single-to-multiple firms. Proprietary costs are measured by 
using the Herfindahl index of industries in which segments operate based on a sample of firms 
in Compustat. See Appendix C for variable definitions. All computed variables are 
Winsorized at the first and ninety-ninth percentiles in each pre- and post-SFAS 131 sample. T-
statistics are estimated using heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors. 
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 i.e., industry concentration. More specifically, I classify a firm as a firm facing high 
(low) proprietary costs if the firm belongs to the top (bottom) 40% in a distribution of 
the asset-weighted average of 1997 segment Herfindhal index. In column 2, when the 
sample is limited to a subset of firms with low proprietary costs, Post 131 * Change 
Firm is not significant. In contrast, in column 3, when the sample is limited to a subset 
of firms with high proprietary costs, Post 131 * Change Firm is significantly negative. 
These results are consistent with those in the first two columns in Panel A. However, 
unlike the results in column 4 of Panel A, when the two subsamples are combined, the 
coefficient on the three-way interaction, Post 131 * Change Firm * Proprietary Cost, 
falls short of conventional significance.30
    Overall, the results in Table 11 suggest that proprietary costs moderate the impact 
of SFAS 131 on firm value for single-to-multiple firms. However, I do not find a value 
increase for single-to-multiple firms even in a subsample of firms with low proprietary 
costs, suggesting that the single-to-multiple firm sample comprises a higher proportion 
of firms with relatively high proprietary costs (that may have caused these firms to 
aggregate all of their segments before SFAS 131) or that single-to-multiple firms are 
more penalized by the market for the newly-revealed nature of diversification than 
multiple-to-multiple firms. 
 
7. Conclusion  
    Superseding SFAS 14, SFAS 131 requires more transparent segment disclosures 
and has thus improved the monitoring environment (Berger and Hann 2003). This 
study finds that diversified firms that changed their segment definitions on adopting 
                                                 
30 I do not include Weighted Average Signed Transfer as an independent variable because doing so 
decreases usable observations by more than a half, reducing the statistical power of my test. Weighted 
Average Signed Transfer is not defined if Compustat reports the same SIC code for every segment for a 
firm. Single-to-multiple sample comprises many firms whose Weighted Average Signed Transfer is not 
defined for this reason. 
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 SFAS 131 (i.e., “change firms”) experienced greater improvement in capital allocation 
efficiency in internal capital markets in the post-SFAS 131 period relative to the pre-
SFAS 131 period than did a control sample of diversified firms that did not change 
their segment definitions (i.e., “no-change firms”). In addition, I find that change firms 
experienced a greater increase in firm value in the post-SFAS 131 period relative to 
the pre-SFAS 131 period than did no-change firms, except for a subsample of firms 
with high proprietary costs.  
    This study is subject to the following limitations. First, firms’ decisions to change 
their segment definitions on adopting SFAS 131 are at least partially endogenous and 
may reflect strategic choices. In particular, if no-change firms have a greater tendency 
to hide segments with the best opportunities, their reporting choices could create a bias 
in favor of my findings. The results documented in the study are robust to a battery of 
tests designed to address this possible bias. However, given the absence of a well-
defined model to predict a firm’s reporting decision following the adoption of SFAS 
131, the models used in this study could be misspecified. 
    Second, following Rajan et al. (2000), I measure a segment’s q by the median q 
of stand-alone firms in the same industry. However, because q is estimated using a 
sample of stand-alone firms, a segment’s investment, compared with the investment of 
stand-alone firms, is less responsive to the investment opportunities proxied for by q. 
This approach thus underestimates the efficiency of internal capital markets (Whited 
2001). Despite this criticism, I follow Rajan et al.’s (2000) approach because a more 
direct measure of investment opportunities at segment level is not practically available. 
In addition, the problem pointed out by Whited (2001) is likely to be less problematic 
for this study because I compare investment efficiency among diversified firms, not 
between diversified firms and stand-alone firms.
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 APPENDIX A: Construction of Subsidy, Signed Subsidy, and Weighted Average 
Signed Subsidy 
 
    Billett and Mauer (2003) compute the amount of subsidy that a segment receives 
as max [Capital Expenditure – After-Tax Cash Flow, 0]. The segment’s after-tax cash 
flow is computed as (Operating Profit – Imputed Interest Expense) * (1 – Imputed Tax 
Rate) + Depreciation. Imputed interest expense is computed as the product of the 
segment’s reported sale and the median ratio of interest expense to sales of single-
segment firms in the segment’s industry. The imputed tax rate is the median ratio of 
taxes paid to pretax income of single-segment firms in the segment’s industry.31  
    Using the amount of subsidy measured following Billett and Mauer (2003), I first 
compute a segment’s subsidy ratio as the amount of subsidy that a segment receives 
divided by the segment’s beginning-of-period asset. Because SFAS 131 requires firms 
to disclose segment information as if the information were used by internal decision-
makers, firms are allowed to choose their own definitions of segment profit. Since this 
reduces the comparability of segment profitability across firms, I further adjust each 
segment’s subsidy ratio by subtracting the asset-weighted average subsidy ratio of the 
firm to which the segment belongs from the segment’s subsidy ratio. The effect of 
external financing is also corrected for by this firm-adjustment procedure.  This study 
uses this firm-adjusted subsidy ratio as a proxy for the subsidy that a segment receives, 
and calls this proxy Subsidy throughout this paper. Specifically, Subsidy of segment j 
of firm i in year t is computed as 
 
                                                 
31 Billett and Mauer (2003) note a potential measurement error that may result from the use of imputed 
interested expense and tax rate. Using the small size of out-of-sample segment data, they find that their 
imputation procedure overestimates segment after-tax cash flow and thus underestimates subsidy. 
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CAPXijt is the capital expenditure of segment j of firm i in year t. ATCFijt is after-tax 
cash flow of segment j of firm i in year t, estimated following Billett and Mauer’s 
procedure (2003). BAijt-1 is the book value of assets of segment j of firm i in year t-1. 
wijt is segment j’s share of total assets of firm i, and n is the number of segments of 
firm i.  
    In addition, to estimate overall efficiency of internal capital markets, this study 
further defines Signed Subsidy for segment j as follows: 
 
Signed Subsidy j = (+1) * segment j’s firm-adjusted subsidy ratio if segment j is a high 
q segment 
Signed Subsidy j = (-1) * segment j’s firm- adjusted subsidy ratio if segment j is a low 
q segment. 
 
    Finally, to construct a firm-level measure of capital allocation efficiency, this 
study computes Weighted Average Signed Subsidy for firm i in year t as 
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 BAijt is the book value of assets of segment j of firm i in year t. wijt is segment j’s share 
of total assets of firm i, and n is the number of segments of firm i.
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 APPENDIX B: Propensity Score Matching Procedures 
 
    If the assignment to a treatment or control group is a function of observable 
variables, matching methods can eliminate the bias arising from the selection on 
observables. Matching is relatively easy if there are only one or two variables 
affecting the assignment. With more than two variables, however, matching would be 
more difficult to implement because multiple dimensions need to be considered 
simultaneously. The propensity score matching method can solve this problem (i.e., 
the “curse of dimensionality”).  
    Propensity score in my study is the probability that a firm chooses to be a change 
firm conditional on a vector of firm characteristics. The propensity score theorem 
states that if the assignment to a treatment or control group is random conditional on a 
vector of firm characteristics, the assignment is also random conditional on the 
propensity score. Since this theorem implies that observations with the same 
propensity score have the same distribution of the full vector of firm characteristics, 
matching of change firms with no-change firms based on comparable propensity 
scores can address a self-selection problem in non-experimental studies (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin 1983). While matching can be performed in various ways, this study 
follows Dehejia and Wahba’s (1999, 2001) stratification matching method 
    More specifically, in the first stage, using every change and no-change firm in the 
sample, I estimate a probit model to produce a probability that a firm changes its 
segment definitions on adopting SFAS 131. This probability is the propensity score 
based on which change and no-change firms are to be matched. The probit model uses 
the independent variables used in the first stage of the instrumental variable approach 
(except for Post 131) as the predictors of a firm’s decision. Then in each change and 
no-change sample, I sort observations from lowest to highest scores. I discard all no-
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 change firms with an estimated propensity score lower (higher) than the minimum 
(maximum) of the propensity score for change firms to improve comparability 
between change and no-change firms. 
    Then I stratify all firms into blocks defined by quantiles of the propensity score 
distribution for change firms until every block is balanced between change and no-
change firms for the propensity score. For a block to be balanced, a t-test result should 
indicate no significant difference in propensity scores between change and no-change 
firms. I begin with quintiles as a convenient starting point for the block definition, but 
the blocks are redefined at a later stage to be finer if all blocks are not balanced 
between change and no-change firms. I obtain 12 blocks satisfying this condition.  
    Then in each block, I run the regression of Weighted Average Signed Transfer (or 
Weighted Average Signed Subsidy) and compute matching estimators as the weighted 
average of the coefficients across the 12 block regressions. The weight is given by the 
number of observations used for the regressions in each block. Finally, I test the 
statistical significance of the coefficients by z-value generated by bootstrap standard 
errors obtained by 1,000 replications. Using a propensity score matching analysis, 
Villalonga (2004) finds that diversification does not destroy value. See Villalonga 
(2004) for additional details about this method. 
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 APPENDIX C: Variable Definition 
 
Weighted Average Signed Transfer: A segment’s Transfer is computed as firm- and 
industry-adjusted investment ratio. Investment ratio is the ratio of the segment’s 
capital expenditure to the segment’s beginning-of-period assets. Industry-adjusted 
investment ratio is the segment’s investment ratio minus the median investment ratio 
of single-segment firms operating in the industry in which the segment also operates. 
Firm- and industry-adjusted investment ratio is the segment’s industry-adjusted 
investment ratio minus the asset-weighted average industry-adjusted investment ratio 
averaged across every segment belonging to the segment’s firm. Signed Transfer is 
(+1) times Transfer if a segment is a high q segment and (-1) times Transfer if a 
segment is a low q segment. A firm’s Weighted Average Signed Transfer is Signed 
Transfer averaged across segments within a firm using segment assets in computing a 
weight.  
 
Weighted Average Signed Subsidy: A segment’s Subsidy is computed as firm-adjusted 
subsidy ratio. Subsidy ratio is the ratio of the segment’s subsidized amount to the 
segment’s beginning-of-period assets. Subsidized amount is max [Capital Expenditure 
– After-Tax Cash Flow, 0]. After-tax cash flow is computed as (Operating Profit – 
Imputed Interest Expense) * (1 – Imputed Tax rate) + Depreciation. Imputed interest 
expense is computed as the product of the segment’s reported sale and the median 
ratio of interest expense to sales of single-segment firms in the segment’s industry. 
The imputed tax rate is the median ratio of taxes paid to pretax income of single-
segment firms in the segment’s industry. Firm-adjusted subsidy ratio is the segment’s 
subsidy ratio minus asset-weighted average subsidy ratio averaged across every 
segment belonging to the segment’s firm. Signed Subsidy is (+1) times Subsidy if a 
segment is a high q segment and (-1) times Subsidy if a segment is a low q segment. A 
firm’s Weighted Average Signed Subsidy is Signed Subsidy averaged across segments 
within a firm using segment assets in computing a weight.  
 
Concentration Ratio: A firm’s Concentration Ratio is the asset-weighted average 
Herfindahl index of industries where the firm’s segments operate, using segment 
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 assets in computing a weight. In each industry, the Herfindahl index is computed as  
Hefindahl Index = ,  ∑∑
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where si is firm i’s sales and n is the number of firms in each industry. 
 
Abnormal Profit Persistence: A firm’s Abnormal Profit Persistence is the asset-
weighted average persistence of abnormal profits of industries where the firm’s 
segments operate, using segment assets in computing a weight. Following Harris 
(1998), the persistence of abnormal profit in each industry is estimated using the firms 
in Compustat between 1979 and 1998 with the following equation.  
ijtijtpjijtnjjijt XDXDX εβββ +++= −− )()( 12110 , 
where Xijt is the difference between firm i’s ROA and the median ROA for its industry, 
j, in year t. Dn is 1 if Xijt-1 is not positive and 0 otherwise. Dp is 1 if Xijt-1 is positive and 
0 otherwise. ROA is defined as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to 
beginning-of-period total assets. The slope coefficient, β2j, captures the persistence of 
abnormal profits in each industry. 
 
Diversity: Following Rajan et al. (2000), a firm’s Diversity is computed as the 
standard deviation of asset-weighted q of its segments divided by the equally weighted 
average q of its segments. Rajan et al. (2000) measure a segment’s w and q at the 
beginning of a fiscal period in order to be consistent with their model. 
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BAijt is book value of assets of segment j of firm i in year t, wijt is segment j’s share of 
total asset of firm i, and n is the number of segments of firm i. 
 
Log (Market Value): A firm’s Log (Market Value) is the natural logarithm of the 
market value of equity (closing price times the number of shares outstanding at the 
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 end of a fiscal year). 
 
Institutional Ownership: A firm’s Institutional Ownership is the percentage shares of 
the firm’s equity held by institutional investors, computed as the number of shares 
held by 13f institutions divided by the number of shares outstanding at the end of a 
fiscal year. If a firm’s shares are not held by 13f institutions, the firm’s Institutional 
Ownership is set to be zero. 
 
Number of Analysts: A firm’s Number of Analysts is the number of forecast estimates 
used in computing a consensus forecast for a fiscal year’s earnings for the last time in 
IBES Summary Statistics. If a firm is not covered by IBES, the firm’s Number of 
Analysts is set to be zero. 
 
Big Auditor: A firm’s Big Auditor is a binary variable that indicates whether the 
firm’s financial statements are audited by big auditors or not. Big Auditor takes a 
value of 1 if a firm’s financial statements are audited by Arthur Andersen, Arthur 
Young, Coopers & Lybrand, Ernst & Young, Deloitte & Touche, KPMG, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, and Touche Ross. Otherwise it takes a value of 0. 
 
Tobin’s q: A firm’s Tobin’s q is computed as (market value of common stocks + book 
value of preferred stocks + book value of debt) / book value of total assets. 
 
ROA: A firm’s ROA is computed as the firm’s earnings before interest and taxes 
divided by the beginning-of-period assets. 
 
Investment Ratio: A firm’s Investment Ratio is capital expenditures divided by the 
beginning-of-period assets. 
 
Diversification: A firm’s Diversification is the inverse of the Herfindahl index 
measured using the firm’s segment sales. In each firm, the Herfindahl index is 
computed as  
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where si is segment i’s sales and n is the number of segments in each firm. 
 
Board Independence: Board Independence is a binary variable indicating whether a 
firm belongs to a subsample of firms with high or low board independence. A firm’s 
Board Independence takes a value of 1 (0) if the firm belongs to the top (bottom) 40% 
in a distribution of the proportion of independent directors on the board. A firm’s 
proportion of independent directors is computed as the number of outside directors 
who are not affiliated with the firm divided by the number of all directors (including 
officers). 
 
High G: High G is a binary variable indicating whether a firm belongs to a subsample 
of firms with high or low Gompers et al’s (2003) G-index. A firm’s High G takes a 
value of 1 (0) if the firm belongs to the top (bottom) 40% in a distribution of the G-
index. 
 
High E: High E is a binary variable indicating whether a firm belongs to a subsample 
of firms with high or low Bebchuk et al.’s (2009) E-index. A firm’s High E takes a 
value of 1 (0) if the firm belongs to the top (bottom) 40% in a distribution of the E-
index. 
 
Proprietary Cost: Proprietary Cost is a binary variable indicating whether a firm 
belongs to a subsample of high or low proprietary cost firms. A firm’s Proprietary 
Cost takes a value of 1 (0) if the firm belongs to the top (bottom) 40% of Abnormal 
Profit Persistence distribution. 
 
q Change: A firm’s q Change is computed as the ratio of the firm’s Tobin’s q 
measured at the end of a fiscal period to the firm’s Tobin’s q measured at the 
beginning of the same period. 
 
Industry-adjusted q Change: A firm’s Industry-adjusted q Change is the firm’s q 
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 Change minus the median q Change of stand-alone firms that operate in the firm’s 
industry. A firm’s industry is defined based on the narrowest SIC grouping (starting 
with four digits) that yields at least three single-segment firms with non-missing 
Tobin’s q. 
 
Market-adjusted Annual Return: A firm’s Market-adjusted Annual Return is computed 
by compounding the firm’s monthly returns adjusted by market returns. To annualize 
monthly returns by compounding, at least six monthly returns are required. 
 
Benchmark-adjusted Annual Return 1: A firm’s Benchmark-adjusted Annual Return 1 
is computed by compounding the firm’s monthly returns adjusted by size and book-to-
market. The size breakpoints for year t are the NYSE firms’ market value of equity 
quintiles at the end of June of t. The market value of equity is price times shares 
outstanding. The book-to-market for June of year t is the book value of equity for the 
last fiscal year end in t-1 divided by the market value of equity for December of t-1. 
The book-to-market breakpoints are NYSE quintiles. The portfolios are then 
constructed at the end of each June. These are the intersections of five portfolios 
formed on size (i.e., market value of equity) and five portfolios formed on book-to-
market. The benchmark portfolios include only stocks with positive book value of 
equity whose CRSP share codes are 10 or 11 (i.e., ordinary common stocks). This 
study uses breakpoints data of size and book-to-market downloaded from 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#Breakpoints. 
 
Benchmark-adjusted Annual Return 2: A firm’s Benchmark-adjusted Annual Return 2 
is computed by compounding the firm’s monthly returns adjusted by size, book-to-
market, and momentum. I use market-adjusted monthly returns compounded over the 
preceding 12 months before portfolio formation as a proxy for momentum. Since 
portfolio is formed at the end of June each year, momentum in year t is measured 
using the market-adjusted monthly returns from July in year t-1 to June in year t. 
 
Earnings: A firm’s Earnings in year t are defined as income before extraordinary items 
divided by the number of shares outstanding, the whole scaled by the closing stock 
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 price at the end of year t-1.  
 
Change in Earnings: A firm’s Change in Earnings in year t is (income before 
extraordinary items in year t-1 minus income before extraordinary items in year t-1) 
divided by the number of shares outstanding, the whole scaled by the closing stock 
price at the end of year t-1. 
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